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FEAR GOD AND DREAD NOUGHT
"The German Emperor is ageing me; he is like a battleship with
steam up and screws going, but with no rudder, and he will run
into something some day and cause a catastrophe."
-Sir Edward Grey
"LOOK in my face; my name is Might-have-been; I am also
called No-more, Too-late, Farewell...."
-Dante Gabriel Rossetti
I. INTRODUCTION
The decade preceding the First World War marked the dawn of the
industrial age of warfare. The conduct of war on land and at sea was
undergoing rapid transformation and experimentation manifested by advances
in force structure, technology, and military doctrine. Protagonists in London
and Berlin focused their naval aspirations on the construction of powerful
capital warships modeled on the British Dreadnought class.' The Royal Navy
was preeminent at sea, but its forces were spread thinly throughout the globe.
The German High Seas Fleet was an upstart, a challenger that sought to cast
into doubt local British naval superiority in Europe. By 1912, Germany was
considering the latest in a series of shipbuilding naval bills in the Reichstag to
build a fleet that could challenge British naval supremacy.2 Britain was
determined to cling to its advantage, promising to exceed any German
shipbuilding program with even greater construction of its own.' Nearly a
decade of intermittent armament limitation negotiations failed to arrest this
classic arms race. The last hope for stopping the spiraling warship competition
was an informal diplomatic mission to Berlin by British Secretary of State for
War Richard Burton Haldane in February 1912.' The envoy failed to reach an
agreement with the Kaiser.'
Capital warships included battleships and large armored cruisers or modem battle cruisers
less than twenty years in age. PAuL KENNEDY, STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY, 1870-1945, at 154-
60(1983).
2 See infra Part III.B.2.
3 See infra Part III.
4 See infra Part III.C. See also, Germans Cool to British, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1912, at 1;
Viscount Haldane's "Conversations," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1912, at 10.
' WhyLordHaldane Failedat Berlin, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1918, at 60. Prince Lichnowsky,
the German ambassador in London, was friendly toward the British position but had little
influence at home. James Brown Scott, Lord Haldane's Diary of Negotiations Between
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But what if Haldane and the Germans had reached an accord? What would
have been the effect of such an agreement to limit the construction of capital
warships? These questions are important because their answers broaden our
exploration of Anglo-German naval arms control before the Great War and
generate observations on the diplomacy of arms control that may be more
generally applicable.
When conflict actually erupted in August of 1914, conventional history
records that the naval rivalry played out in the theater of the North Atlantic.6
Ironically, the weapons at the center of the political and naval
rivalry-dreadnought battleships-largely proved irrelevant to the war. The
two powerful fleets met in only one inconclusive engagement at Jutland in
1916.' German submarine strategy dominated the naval war, the only
component of the war at sea to shape the war on the continent in any
significant way.
We might expect that an Anglo-German agreement in 1912 to limit
dreadnoughts would have yielded some appreciable benefit such as a reduction
in the risk of war in 1914 or a reduction in the lethality of the war. Instead,
perhaps the most likely outcome of such an agreement would have been a re-
direction of the German naval effort away from capital warships and a re-
channeling of resources into submarines. In that case, Britain would have been
worse within an agreement than outside of it. More generally, this
counterfactual suggests that arms control negotiators have to be as cognizant
of emerging military technology and doctrine as they are of the principles of
international law and politics.
Part II addresses the interdisciplinary theoretical approach of this project
and conducts some methodological housekeeping related to diplomacy, arms
control, and counterfactual models. Part III provides an overview of Anglo-
German naval diplomacy before the Great War. Among a series of entreaties
and negotiations to reduce the battleship competition between Berlin and
London, the Haldane negotiations of 1912 stand out as the final opportunity for
naval accommodation. The mission failed, but Part IV explores the
counterfactual-what if it had succeeded and an accord was reached to limit
capital warships? The counterfactual offers a plausible story about how the
Germany and England in 1912, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 834, 834 (1918). •
6 See infra Part IV.A. See generally ROBERT K. MASSIE, CASTLES OF STEEL: BRITAIN,
GERMANY, AND THE WINNING OF THE GREAT WAR AT SEA (2003) [hereinafter MASSIE, CASTLES
OF STEEL].
7 MASSIE, CASTLES OF STEEL, supra note 6, at 658-63. See also GEOFFREY BENNETT, THE
BATTLE OF JUTLAND (1964).
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personalities and politics might have aligned to produce a naval arms control
agreement. Generally, arms control agreements can be understood as an
international public good, generating positive economic and political
externalities for the participating states. This study, however, shows that
before World War I, an agreement to limit capital warships likely would have
incited the Germans to re-channel or re-direct their naval efforts into
submarines, leading to potentially disastrous consequences for the British.
Part V concludes by exploring the effect of an agreement on the naval rivalry
and by offering some additional lessons for arms control more generally.
II. THE INTERDISCIPLINARY NATURE OF INQUIRY INTO DIPLOMACY
This part unpacks the diplomacy of arms control against the backdrop of
international relations theory. There are three dimensions to this theoretical
review. Subpart A, infra, focuses on the proper location of arms control
diplomacy along the realist-liberal divide. The subpart will conclude that arms
control is a valuable feature of international relations, drawing theoretical
strength from its use of both realism and liberalism. Subpart B, infra,
addresses the levels of analysis problem-what is the best theoretical level to
serve as a point of departure in understanding arms control diplomacy?
Although the world system and state levels of analysis are factors in
diplomacy, the critical locus of movement and change in arms control
diplomacy is the individual level of analysis, that is, the success or failure of
diplomats and leaders. Subpart C, infra, discusses the uses and limits of
counterfactual analysis in international law and diplomacy. Counterfactual
methodology is associated with some amount of controversy, but leading
figures in a range of disciplines, including economics, history, and
international relations, have employed counterfactual analysis as a heuristic to
open new lines of inquiry and as a means of improving findings within the
discipline. Interestingly, while civil and criminal law and the social sciences
are increasingly utilizing counterfactual experiments, international law has
largely ignored or neglected the methodology. In that sense, this piece
represents a new departure in the analysis of the study of arms control and
international law.
A. Realism and Liberalism as Guides in Diplomacy
This counterfactual analysis is necessarily interdisciplinary, lying at the
intersection of history and diplomacy and extracting insights from interest
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group politics, grand strategy, and arms control. The prospect that
interdisciplinary scholarship can produce meaningful findings has compelled
scholars and practitioners of international law to unapologetically open a
dialogue with these supporting disciplines.8 As part of a broader effort to map
the theoretical topography of global politics and international change, scholars
have sought to divine the causes of war in the hope of getting out in front and
avoiding cataclysm. A variety of theories have been proposed about the'nature
of international relations and the origin of war, and the two broadest schools
of thought are realism and liberalism. The perennial questions are: Why do
international events occur? How do events unfold, and who is responsible for
shaping them? Competing schools of thought have coalesced around a variety
of factors, including character and personality models,9 imbalances in power
relationships among states, 10  deterministic world system models,1
nationalism, 2  naturally aggressive tendencies of human nature, 3
institutionalist models of cooperation, 4 economic theories of imperialism, 5
See, e.g., TOWARD UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TooLBox (Charlotte Ku & Thomas George Weiss eds., 1998);
Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International
Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'LL. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and
International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993).
9 See, e.g., JOHN G. STOESSINGER, WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR (8th ed. 2001).
10 For the classic restatement of realism, see HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG
NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (Kenneth W. Thompson rev. 6th ed. 1984).
The "structural realist" school of realism focuses on geopolitical architecture. See, e.g., JOHN
J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001); KENNETH N. WALTZ,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).
" See, e.g., GEORGE MODELSKI, LONG CYCLES IN WORLD POLITICS (1987); WORLD SYSTEM
HISTORY: THE SOCIAL SCIENCE OF LONG-TERM CHANGE (Robert A. Denmark et al. eds., 2000).
12 See, e.g., KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR 174-79 (1959).
13 See, e.g., KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION (Marjorie Kerr Wilson trans., 1966); Peter
A. Coming, The Biological Bases of Behavior and Some Implications for Political Science, 23
WORLD POL. 321, 342-44 (1971).
" See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane,International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT'LSTUD.
Q. 379 (1988); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction
of Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992).
'5 See generally J.A. HOBSON, IMPERIALISM: A STUDY (1965); V.I. LENIN, IMPERIALISM: THE
HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM, A POPULAR OUTLINE (1939).
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theories of special commercial advantage, 6 environmental stress, 7 and the
misbehavior of non-democratic regimes," among others.
Fundamentally, law and politics are at the core of this inquiry. It has been
nearly four decades since Louis Henkin observed, "the student of law and the
student of politics... purport to be looking at the same world from the vantage
point of important disciplines. It seems unfortunate, indeed destructive, that
they should not, at the least, hear each other."' 9 Despite the renaissance in
interdisciplinary international law and international relations scholarship over
the previous decade, international law often remains trapped within the
confines of formalistic legal structure. Integrating these disciplines within the
model of counterfactual analysis offers particular value in informing how
states approach the politics of arms control and strategic negotiation.
Working across methodological and conceptual lines of demarcation poses
special challenges, causing some international lawyers to abandon the task
altogether. In particular, some prominent scholars say the divide cannot be
bridged. In mapping the terrain, Professor Jonathan Greenberg of Stanford
Law School, for example, refers to the two opposing world views of realism
and liberal internationalism and maintains they cannot be reconciled.
According to Professor Greenberg, liberal internationalism, which emphasizes
the rule of law, state cooperation, and the centrality of the individual, and
realism, which focuses on the struggle for power, cannot be simultaneously
correct.20 Today, most scholars accept realism as informing the foundation of
modem international relations theory. Professor Greenberg argues that it is the
polar opposite of liberal internationalism, to which international law is
secured.21 Attempting to combine the two approaches is akin to intellectual
6 See F.E. Chadwick, The Anglo-German Tension and a Solution, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 601,
612-13 (1912) (providing a polemic on colonialism and markets).
'7 See, e.g., Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict:
,Evidence from Cases, 19 INT'L SEC. 5, 35-36 (1994); Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, On the
Threshold. Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict, 16 INT'L SEC. 76, 106-13
(1991), available at http://www.homerdixon.com/academicwriting.html.
18 See, e.g., JOHN NORTON MOORE, SOLVING THE WAR PUZZLE: BEYOND THE DEMOCRATIC
PEACE (2004); BRUCE RuSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-
COLD WAR WORLD (1993); John R. Oneal & Bruce Russett, The Kantian Peace: The Pacific
Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992, 52
WORLD POL. 1,34-37 (1999); Bruce Russett, Correspondence, The Democratic Peace: And Yet
It Moves, 19 INT'L SEC. 164 (1995).
19 Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 6 (1968).
20 Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1789, 1802 (2003).
21 Id. at 1804-05.
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warfare, with scholars on both sides willing to ignore or ridicule the other.
Professor Greenberg writes, "[tihese opposing visions suggest a fundamental
dialectic in human thought and culture. This dialectic is our inheritance. It
cannot be 'resolved.' "22 This piece takes exception to that fatalistic
conclusion by eschewing pigeon-hole analysis and borrowing freely from both
schools of thought.23
Perhaps nowhere is the dialectic between realism and liberalism more
apparent than in the contradictions of the men in this study. In London, the
new leaders were just emerging from the pomposity and sensibility of the
Victorian Age.24 The leaders in Berlin glorified aristocratic nationalism and
represented the fading twilight of the ancien regime.25 Realists to a man, the
more perceptive exposed a glimmer of disquiet over the immense military
power at their disposal and the urgent need for international accommodation.
B. Diplomacy and the First Image
One of the chief influences of realist political theory is Kenneth N. Waltz's
profound exegesis on the causes of interstate conflict, Man, the State and War.
Waltz approached his study of locating the cause of war through three
"images" or lenses-the individual, the state, and the international system. 26
According to Waltz's first image, the primary locus of the most important
causes of war resides in the aggressive, selfish, and foolish nature of man.27
In recognition of the importance of individuals in diplomacy, David Lloyd
George remarked after the First World War, "Had there been a Bismarck in
Germany, or a Palmerston or a Disraeli in Britain, a Roosevelt in America, or
a Clemenceau in authority in Paris, the catastrophe might, and I believe would,
have been averted .... ,28 In support of first image analysis, Henry Kissinger
22 Id. at 1804.
23 In contrast, Professor Greenberg advocates that liberals should circle the wagons,
sustaining a "plurality of voices" in order to fend off realist critiques of liberalism to preserve
the dominant "efficacy and influence of liberal international law discourse." Id. at 1803-04.
24 BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, THE PROUD TOWER: A PORTRAIT OF THE WORLD BEFORE THE
WAR, 1890-1914, at 352-53 (1966).
25 JOHN C.G. ROHL, THE KAISER AND HIS COuRT: WILHELM II AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
GERMANY 199-201 (Terence F. Cole trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1987). The Kaiser,
in particular, was, as Crown Prince Rudolph ofAustria remarked a "dyed-in-the-wool Junker and
reactionary." Id. at 199.
26 WALTz, supra note 12, at 12.
27 Id. at 16.
28 DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, WAR MEMOIRS OF DAvID LLOYD GEORGE, 1914-1915, at 53
[Vol. 34:43
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remarked to reporters on background in 1975, "As a professor, I tended to
think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice,
you see the -difference personalities make.,
29
Second image analysis attempts to discern whether the causes of peace and
war are products of good and bad states and their governing regimes.3" From
the vantage of Waltz's second image, the focus of progressive policy should
be on changing the present condition or character of states and their
governments.
Sovereign states make their way in an anarchic world system, and Waltz's
third image posits that warfare is an inevitable consequence of their journey.3
In the classical world, Thucydides wrote that the cause of the Peloponnesian
War was "[t]he growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this
inspired in Sparta," making war inevitable.32 At the inception of the industrial
age, Marx, Hegel, and Spengler believed that historical forces swept the
international system along in an inevitable "march of history."33 Realist
approaches to the third image have dominated modern international relations
theory for decades.34
This analysis invokes second image factors, such as German and British
affairs of state and parliamentary politics, as well as third image factors, such
as the geo-strategic dimension of Anglo-German naval rivalry. The final step
toward reaching a warship limitation agreement, however, had to be taken by
individual leaders. Toward that end, this inquiry returns to Waltz's frequently
neglected first image35 to harvest insights from diplomatic negotiations. First
(1933).
29 WALTER ISAACSON, KISSINGER: A BIOGRAPHY 13 (1992).
30 WALTZ, supra note 12, at 114.
3" Id. at 159.
32 THE LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
16 (Robert B. Strassler ed., 1996).
33 ISAIAH BERLIN, HISTORICAL INEVITABILITY 10 (1954). See also WILLIAM A. GREEN,
HISTORY, HISTORIANS, AND THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE (1993) (discussing neo-Malthusian
demographic models, capitalist, Marxist, and neo-Marxist world systems models, as well as
environmental and cultural models of secular change in international affairs).
34 See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (1983) (noting that states
seek to alter the international system through territorial, political, or economic expansion until
the marginal costs of continuing change are greater than the marginal benefits); WALTZ, supra
note 10 (stating that the distribution of power among states is the driving force in international
politics). For debates on Waltz's work, see NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Robert O. Keohane
ed., 1986).
" See, e.g., J. David Singer, The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations, 14
WORLD POL. 77, 84-90 (1961) (providing a false choice between the world-system level of
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image analysis suggests that it is people who precipitate war and are in a
position to negotiate peace. 36 The process of Anglo-German arms control
offers an exceptional case study in first image analysis. The personalities are
vivid, and British and German diplomatic correspondence is well-preserved.
The men in London and Berlin were titans, exercising the power and
implements of war of the twentieth century while their diplomatic vista held
fast to a prior age.
C. Counterfactual Analysis in International Law and Diplomacy
Looking at what might have been against the template of how events
actually unfolded can illuminate the potential benefits of paths not taken,
identify disasters averted, and help us to think about how to construct the
future. Asking "what if' by posing counterfactuals helps reveal how events in
history are interconnected. Doing so increases our degrees of freedom by
imagining case histories "in which the presumed causal agent is absent [from
reality] but everything else that is relevant [to actual history] is identical."37
The purpose of counterfactual thought experiments is to underscore that there
are few inevitabilities in history and to gain "a more sophisticated appreciation
of causation."38 History, it has been said, enables us to escape the errors of the
dead, inspiring George Santayana to remark, "[T]hose who cannot remember
the past are condemned to repeat it."39 History shows us what to avoid, even
if it cannot teach us what to do.40
Counterfactual history seeks to leverage actual history, getting more work
out of historical events by asking "what if." Counterfactual analysis has
become a useful methodology in history and the social sciences for thinking
through options, ascertaining causes, and extracting lessons from case studies.
Some of the most prominent contemporary historians have explicitly adopted
the counterfactual as a basis for emphasizing the importance of historical
forces and personalities and for exploring alternative futures. In employing
analysis and the nation-state level of analysis, while mostly ignoring first image analysis).
36 STOESSINGER, supra note 9, at xi, 209-10.
37 James D. Fearon, Counterfactuals andHyopthesis Testing in Political Science, 43 WORLD
POL. 169, 173 (1991).
31 William H. Honan, Historians Warming to Games of 'What If, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1998,
at B7 (quoting Philip E. Tetlock, a professor of psychology at Ohio State University,
commenting on the increasing prevalence of counterfactual scenarios).
39 GREEN, supra note 33, at 3.
40 B.H. LIDDELL HART, WHY DON'T WE LEARN FROM HISTORY? 15 (1971).
[Vol. 34:43
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counterfactual analysis, historians have focused particular interest on colonial
America.41 One New York Times bestseller, What I?, includes counterfactual
speculations by distinguished authors Stephen E. Ambrose and David
McCullough, among others.42 Clearly the genre has taken hold in the last few
years. What If? produced a camp following of similar anthologies and a few
novels.43 Financial historian Niall Ferguson edited a similar volume focusing
41 See, e.g., James Axtell, Colonial America Without the Indians: Counterfactual
Reflections, 73 J. AM. HIST. 981 (1987) (exploring social, military, and political effects on the
United States in the absence of Native Americans); Jeremy Black, Rethinking the Revolutionary
War: Should the British Have Won?, 17 MHQ: Q. J. MIL. HIST. 43 (2005) (claiming that the
British should have won the Revolutionary War); John M. Murrin, No Awakening, No
Revolution? More Counterfactual Speculations, 11 REV. AM. HIST. 161 (1983) (discussing that
the American Revolution may not have occurred but for the Great Awakening); John M. Murrin,
The French and Indian War, the American Revolution, and the Counterfactual Hypothesis:
Reflections on Lawrence Henry Gipson and John Shy, 1 REV. AM. HIST. 307 (1973) (arguing
that British politics rather than colonial drive for independence caused the loss of the American
colonies).
42 WHAT IF? THE WORLD'S FOREMOST MILITARY HISTORIANS IMAGINE WHAT MIGHT HAVE
BEEN (Robert Cowley ed., 1999). See also WHAT IF?. 2: EMINENT HISTORIANS IMAGINE WHAT
MIGHT HAVE BEEN (Robert Cowley ed., 2001). What If? 2 contains counterfactual essays by
leading history scholars, including, inter alia, William H. McNeill, Professor Emeritus of
History at the University of Chicago, John Lukacs, Professor Emeritus of History at Chestnut
Hill College, military historians Alistair Home and Caleb Carr, Lance Morrow, Professor of
Journalism at Boston University, and deceased (2004) Bard College chaired professor and
historian James Chace, who was one of the most influential foreign policy analysts of the last
half century. Arising from the What If? series is a similar collection, WHAT IFS? OF AMERICAN
HISTORY: EMINENT HISTORIANS IMAGINE WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN (Robert Cowley ed., 2003),
which, as advertised, actually contains chapters by eminent historians, including James M.
McPherson, David McCullough, and Antony Beevor, among others.
43 In 2004, a collection was released titled, WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN: IMAGINARY HISTORY
FROM TWELVE LEADING HISTORIANS (Andrew Roberts ed., 2004), followed by WHAT MIGHT
HAVE BEEN: ALTERNATE HEROES (Gregory Benford & Martin Greenberg eds., 2004) and WHAT
MIGHT HAVE BEEN: ALTERNATE WARS (Gregory Benford & Martin Greenberg eds., 2004).
Another war anthology is Cold War Hot: Alternative Decisions in the East- West Struggle (Peter
Tsouras ed., 2003) (discussing scenarios for how the Cold War could have become a shooting
war). In the last few years, a number of novels have been released that employ the counterfactual
device, and these include MACKINLAY KANTOR, IF THE SOUTH HAD WON THE CIVIL WAR (2001)
(dealing with an update on a counterfactual that appeared in Look magazine about five decades
ago), J.N. STROYAR, THE CI-nLDREN'S WAR (2001) (telling a story as if the Nazis had won World
War II), ROBERT CONROY, 1901 (1995) (using the premise that Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany
invades the United States in 1901), Bill Yenne, A DAMNED FINE WAR (2004) (exploring what
would happen if the Soviets invaded the West in 1945), and Philip Roth, THE PLOT AGAINST
AMERICA (2004) (pretending that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was defeated by pro-Nazi
Republican nominee Charles Lindberg in the 1940 presidential contest).
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on British and European historical counterfactuals." These scholars follow in
the footsteps of Sir John C. Squire who, in 1931, released If or History
Rewritten, an anthology which ruminated on questions such as: What if John
Wilkes Booth's bullet had missed President Lincoln?45 Beyond these, there is
literally an avalanche of writing in history and political science that explicitly
or implicitly invokes historical counterfactual analysis.46
Much of modem counterfactual methodology has its roots in economic
history. Nearly fifty years ago, for example, E. Cary Brown challenged
contemporary historiography that government economic policy in the 1930s
was not the result of President Roosevelt's imaginative application of
Keynesian policy. 7 This was followed soon after by a stable of seminal
counterfactual studies. In 1958, Alfred Conrad and John Meyer challenged the
belief that slavery was economically unprofitable, suggesting that the immoral
institution would have prevailed well into the 1940s but for the Civil War.48
Robert Fogel was another pioneer in cliometric counterfactuals. 49 He wrote
perhaps the classic counterfactual analysis, challenging conventional belief
that the railroad was essential for American economic development. Fogel
argued the average American worker would have been only about 4% less
productive had the railroad not been invented and people had to rely solely on
roads and canals to move goods throughout the country.50 Building on this
44 VIRTuAL HISTORY: ALTERNATIVES AND COUNTERFACTUALS (Niall Ferguson ed., 1997).
45 IF, OR HISTORY REWRITTEN (Kennikat Press 1964) (1931).
46 See, e.g., ERIK DURSCHMIED, THE HINGE FACTOR: How CHANCE AND STUPIDITY HAVE
CHANGED HISTORY (2000) (arguing that seismic events in history, such as the fall of the Berlin
Wall, hinged on rather ordinary, even, random, events); JAMES M. PERRY, ARROGANT ARMIES:
GREAT MILITARY DISASTERS AND THE GENERALS BEHIND THEM (1996) (finding that the
personalities of military leaders were key to significant military disasters). In one of the
monumental questions of counterfactual history, Edward Gibbon, writing at the end of the 52nd
chapter of The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, considered whether all of
Europe would have fallen to Islam if the French had failed to defeat the invading Muslim army
in a battle located between Tours and Poitiers in 732 (A.D.). If Islam had won, Gibbon
speculates that the interpretation of the Qur'an would be taught in the schools of Oxford.
EDWARD GIBBON, 3 HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 336 (David
Womersley ed., 1994) (1788).
17 E. Cary Brown, Fiscal Policy in the 'Thirties: A Reappraisal, 46 AM ECON. REv. 857
(1956).
48 Alfred H. Conrad & John R. Meyer, The Economics of Slavery in the Ante Bellum South,
66 J. POL. ECON. 95 (1958).
" Among the nine ancient mythological Greek muses, Clio was the muse of history.
50 ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, RAILROADS AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ESSAYS IN
ECONOMETRIC HISTORY (1964); Robert Fogel, Notes on the Social Saving Controversy, 39 J.
[Vol. 34:43
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early research, economists have been particularly prone to use counterfactual
reasoning. Economic historians,5 contemporary development economists,52
and international monetary macroeconomists53  have all employed
counterfactual analysis.
Historians and international relations scholars find it fruitful to employ
counterfactual analysis because it eliminates "hindsight bias."54 Plausible
counterfactual reasoning, when grounded in a carefully designed and coherent
structure, is a particularly useful device for evaluating courses of action in
international law, diplomacy, and international relations. "[T]he assessment
of counterfactuals provides a basis for understanding whether what has been
(or will be) was, ex ante, the likely path of events., 55 As in the discipline of
history, some of the most prominent theorists in international relations, such
EcoN. HIST. 1 (1979). Robert Fogel went on to earn the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1993. His
biography is available at http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1993/fogel-autobio.html.
"I Barry Eichengreen & Peter Temin, Afterward, Counterfactual Histories of the Great
Depression, in THE WORLD ECONOMY AND NATIONAL ECONOMIES BETWEEN THE WARS (Theo
Balderston ed., forthcoming), available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/eichengr/research/
counter-histories.pdf; Sean Glynn & Alan Booth, Building Counterfactual Pyramids, 38 ECoN.
HIST. REv. 89 (1985); J.D. Gould, Hypothetical History, 22 ECON. HIST. REv. 195 (1969);
Christian St6gebauer & John Komlos, Averting the Nazi Seizure of Power: A Counterfactual
Thought Experiment, 8 EUR. REV. ECON. HIST. 173 (2004) (discussing whether fiscal policy
could have lowered unemployment in pre-Nazi Germany and undercut Nazi support, thereby
preserving Weimar democracy), available athttp://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
512322. See also George G.S. Murphy, On Counterfactual Propositions, 9 HIST. & THEORY 14
(1969).
52 James Copestake & Philip Weston, Promises and Pitfalls of Debt Forgiveness: A
Counterfactual Case Study of Zambia During the Early 1990s (Sept. 12, 1999) (paper presented
at the Development Studies Association 1999 Annual Conference, Center for Development
Studies, University of Bath, available at http://www.devstud.org.uk/publications/papers/conf99/
dsaconf99copestake.pdf).
" Niall Ferguson, Return of the German Nightmare, TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002, at 7 (advocating
that Germany would experience greater economic growth if its monetary policy were severed
from the Euro); J&r6me Hericourt, Has the ECB Been Wrong? A Lesson from Counterfactual
Simulations (May 2004) (paper arguing that simulations support finding that ECB monetary
policy is preferable to individual state monetary policies), available at http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/
t2m2005/Textes%20des%20communications%5 CC92.pdf.
" Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After the
Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 311 (1990).
'5 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Counterfactuals and International Affairs: Some Insightsfrom
Game Theory, in COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN WORLD POLITICS: LOGICAL,
METHODOLOGICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 211-43 (Philip E. Tetlock & Aaron
Belkin, eds., 1996).
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as Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Robert Jervis, use counterfactual devices.56
In a counterfactual analysis of the prospects for war on the Korean peninsula,
Professor David C. Kang of Dartmouth College explains, "Social scientists can
learn as much from events that did not happen as from those that did."57
Among the professions, lawyers make perhaps greater use ofcounterfactual
analysis.58 The entire field of negligence in tort, for example, is premised on
"but for" causality.59 The reasonable person inquiry is implicitly constructed
around counterfactual reasoning.60 Litigators seek to shape jurors' thoughts
about "what might have been."'" Openness to counterfactual analysis requires
some reception to storytelling. Formalist and realist legal scholarship
traditionally has placed a premium on analysis derived from logos, or logic,
rationality, and reason.62 More recently, law has opened to the value of
56 See, e.g., id.; Robert Jervis, Counterfactuals, Causation, and Complexity, in
COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN WORLD POLITICS: LOGICAL, METHODOLOGICAL,
AND PSYCHOLOGICALPERSPECT1VES 309 (Philip E. Tetlock& Aaron Belkin eds., 1996); Richard
Ned Lebow & Janice Gross Stein, Back to the Past: Counterfactuals and the Cuban Missile
Crisis, in COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN WORLD POLITICS: LOGICAL,
METHODOLOGICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICALPERSPECTIVES 119 (Philip E. Tetlock & Aaron Belkin
eds., 1996); Bruce Russett, Counterfactuals About War and lts Absence, in COUNTERFACTUAL
THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN WORLD POLITICS: LOGICAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 171 (Philip E. Tetlock & Aaron Belkin eds., 1996). For a more recent example,
see Fearon, supra note 37.
" David C. Kang, International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War 5 (Jan. 3,
2003) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/-dkang/publications/
dog.pdf).
58 See Robert N. Strassfeld, If...: Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 339,
345 (1992) (noting that counterfactual inquiry is pervasive in many stages of legal fact-finding
and decision making).
" Michael S. Moore, For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual Baselines, in
CAUSATION AND RESPONSBILITY (Feb. 28-Mar. 1, 2003) (unpublished paper presented at a
symposium on What Do Compensatory Damages Compensate? Institute for Law and Philosophy,
University of San Diego, forthcoming).
60 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (requiring one to hypothesize as to
what a "reasonable man" would have done under similar circumstances). See also JON ELSTER,
LOGIC AND SOCIETY: CONTRADICTIONS AND POSSIBLE WORLDS 180 (1978) (discussing the use
of the reasonable man standard).
61 Ken Broda-Bahm, Your Counterfactual Strategy: How You Can Influence Jurors'
Thoughts about What Might Have Been, in PERSUASION STRATEGIES, available at http://www.
persuasionstrategies.com/Docs/Counterfactual.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2005).
62 Modem American jurisprudence has its genesis in legal formalism, "the endeavor to treat
particular fields of knowledge as if governed by interrelated, fundamental and logically
demonstrable principles of science." NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
10 (1995). In one of the first assaults on legal formalism, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. recounted,
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mythos, or the methodology of storytelling and narrative. Although mythos has
done most of its work as a supplement to traditional scholarship, some critical
approaches rely entirely on the narrative method.63
1. Counterfactual Methodology
Social scientists have brought a fair degree of rigor to counterfactual
analysis. Adhering to certain stipulations can separate mere convenient
speculation from useful conclusions derived from empirical evidence.' 4
Counterfactuals require inferences to be made in answering "what if'
questions and in estimating causal effects, and those inferences should flow
from marshaled data. Counterfactuals should have well-specified antecedents
and consequences,65  logical consistency in connecting principles
(cotenability), 6  consistency with well-established historical facts,67
consistency with well-established theoretical laws and generalizations,68 and
some measure ofprojectability.69 This coherent structure serves as a template
for the present counterfactual analysis.
Counterfactual scenarios should be bound by parameters of importance and
reality. Drawing these limits is an exercise injudgment. It is important not to
become carried away with a counterfactual that is so remotely insignificant
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 14
AM. L. REV. 233,234 (1880) (book review). Holmes called C.C. Langdell, somewhat unkindly,
the "greatest living legal theologian ... [entirely interested] in the formal connection of things,
or logic." Id. at 234.
63 The critical legal studies movement was perhaps the first to introduce the power of
narrative as a legal methodology. More recently, critical race and feminist perspectives have
developed and utilized narrative to great effect. For representative scholarship, see, e.g., Brian
Owsley, Black Ivy: An African-American Perspective on Law School, 28 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 501 (1997), and Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal
Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989).
6 Gary King & Langche Zeng, When Can History be Our Guide? The Pitfalls of
Counterfactual Inference (Aug. 29, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://gking.
harvard.edu/files/counterf.pdf).
6 Philip E. Tetlock & Aaron Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in WorldPolitics:
Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives, in COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT
EXPERIMENTS IN WORLD POLITICS: LOGICAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 1, 19-21 (Philip E. Tetlock & Aaron Belkin eds., 1996).
66 Id. at 21-23.
67 Id. at 23-25.
68 Id. at 25-30.
69 Id. at 30-31.
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that its proximate connection to causative fact becomes extremely doubtful.
The inquiry "becomes progressively more hopeless to the degree that the
triumph of civilization hinges on the horse-shoe-nail (or butterfly) effects in
battles."7 Thus, something possible, but likely to be irrelevant, does not
contribute to the counterfactual exercise. On the other hand, it is equally
useless to posit something that is at once grand, but impossible. The common
supposition, "if pigs could fly," for example, is not a useful antecedent since
it negates our understanding of the laws of nature.
Counterfactual experiments may be organized into distinct ideal types. A
particular hypothetical exercise may involve one or more type. First,
idiographic case-study counterfactuals highlight points of indeterminacy at
specific junctures in time.7' In the present hypothetical, the Haldane Mission
is selected as the most plausible entry point for a diplomatic breakthrough to
control Anglo-German capital ship competition.
Second, nomothetic or systemic counterfactuals apply theoretical and
historical generalizations to well-defined antecedent conditions.7 These
counterfactuals draw upon the explanatory power of models and assume the
logical consequence of their application, such as: What if the United States and
Europe rejected trade protectionism in the 1930s? This study employs a
paradigmatic model of arms control called "re-channeling" or "re-direction,"
which suggests that once states have set arms control limits, they begin to
make new strategic choices to optimize their military position within the
confines of the treaty. This Article suggests that an Anglo-German naval
agreement on capital warships could have precipitated a shift by Germany
away from armored, big-gun battleships and toward far less expensive, and yet
more lethal, submarines. Such a shift likely would have inured greater
advantage to Germany in the First World War. When war came, the German
surface navy was ineffectual, but its submarine force nearly knocked Britain
out of the war.73 Third, combined idiographic and nomothetic counterfactuals
combine historic case studies with theoretical constructs that seek to identify
empirical patterns that can generate theory-informed history.74 Borrowing
70 Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Ned Lebow, Poking CounterfactualHoles in CoveringLaws:
Cognitive Styles and Historical Reasoning, 95 AM. POL. Scl. REv. 829, 829 (2001).
"' Tetlock & Belkin, supra note 65, at 7-8.
72 Id. at 8-10.
73 BERNARD BRODIE & FAWN M. BRODIE, FROM CROSSBOW TO H-BOMB: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE WEAPONS AND TACTICS OF WARFARE 182-83 (rev. ed. 1973) (1962).
" Tetlock & Belkin, supra note 65, at 10-12.
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from both the first and second types of counterfactuals discussed above, this
Article adopts a hybrid model.
Fourth, mental simulation counterfactuals seek to reveal latent
psychological gaps and contradictions in cognitive belief systems.75 Mental
simulations acquire persuasive force and rhetorical power through exposing
previously unnoticed tensions between explicit and conscious beliefs and
implicit or hidden ones. One prominent set of such mental simulations are
game theoretical models of decision making, which were used by defense
analysts and political scientists to better understand the dynamics of nuclear
deterrence,7 6 strategic cooperation,77 and nuclear escalation dominance." The
present study skirts the edge of these cognitive and personality models by
bringing greater focus to bear on the arms control process.
These methods may be tested through mental thought experiments,
computer simulations, and/or table-top war games. War games have long been
effectively employed by defense analysts and the military to test operations,
doctrine, and force structure. 79 The U.S. Navy, in particular, has a long history
of experimenting with table-top war game simulations, which have been used
in support of teaching objectives at the Naval War College since 1887.80
Conducting gaming exercises is an integral part of the development of strategy,
" Id. at 13-16.
76 See ROBERTJERVIS, PERCEPTION ANDMISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONALPOLITICS 58-110
(1976); THoMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 119-61 (1960). See generally
ROBERT JERVIS ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY AND DETERRENCE (1985).
77 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 31-48 (1984).
78 See generally PAUL BRACKEN, THE COMMANDAND CONTROLOFNUCLEARFORCES (1983);
HERMAN KAHN, ON ESCALATION: METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS (1965).
79 See generally Peter P. Perla & Raymond T. Barrett, An Introduction to Wargaming and
Its Uses (Oct. 1985) (unpublished research memorandum, available at http://www.cha.org/
documents/2785009 1 00.pdf). For a general history ofwar gaming, see Matthew Caffrey, History
of Wargames: Toward a History Based Doctrine for Wargaming as of 6 Jan. 2000, available
at http://www.strategypage.com/wargames/articles/wargame-articles-2004980.asp.
80 The Naval War College continues to operate one ofthe most advanced war gaming centers
in the world. For a report on the Naval War College's comprehensive Global War Game, see
Robert H. Gile, Global War Game: Second Series 1984-1988 (2004) (unpublished research
paper, available at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/npapers/np20/NP20.pdf). For a discussion
on the interrelationship between war games and military exercises, see Peter P. Perla & Darryl
L. Branting, Wargames, Exercises, and Analysis (Feb. 1986) (unpublished research
memorandum, available at http://www.cha.org/documents/2786002000.pdf). Over the last few
years, the Naval Warfare Development Command, located adjacent to the Naval War College
in Newport, Rhode Island, has conducted fleet battle experiments and engaged in advanced
concept development. See generally Navy Warfare Department Command, at http://www.nwdc.
navy.mil.
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doctrine and force structure. After World War II, for example, Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz wrote,
The war with Japan has been re-enacted in the game rooms at the
War College by so many people, and in so many different ways,
that nothing that happened during the war was a
surprise-absolutely nothing except the Kamikaze tactics near
the end of the war-we had not visualized these."1
Today, the effort to "game" alternative future scenarios in the war on terrorism
is reminiscent of these earlier efforts.8 2
To be useful, counterfactuals should have some measure ofprojectability.8 3
The present counterfactual adheres to a classic form of projectability by
assuming the Haldane Accord would have been an impetus for accelerating
German submarine innovation and strategy. This method tends to be more
plausible than creating a morass of new facts. Moreover, an accelerated
German submarine program likely would have had a profound impact on the
Allied war effort.
Despite the value counterfactuals bring to scholarship and real-world policy
and planning, their use is not free from controversy. Before we begin to open
the Haldane negotiations for closer examination and subject them to
counterfactual inquiry, it is useful to engage in a brief encounter with the
critics of counterfactual analysis.
2. Criticism of Counterfactual Analysis
Critics assert that all counterfactual analysis represents a methodological
fallacy constructed around fictional questions.8 4 Critics of counterfactuals
assert, "It is always possible, of course, to convert any historical problem into
a nonhistorical one, but why should a scholar go out of his way to make a
"I U.S. Naval War College, War Gaming Department, at http://wgd.nwc.navy.mil (quoting
Admiral Nimitz) (last visited Oct. 8, 2005).
82 See, e.g., AFTER9-1 1-01: LONGTERMIMPLICATIONS OFTHE WARONTERRORISM FORU.S.
BusiNEss AND PoucY (Hudson Inst., 2002) (envisioning three potential "master scenario"
outcomes to the war on terrorism: the war on terrorism recedes as history, the war on terrorism
becomes a way of life, and the war on terrorism becomes a global nightmare).
83 Tetlock & Belkin, supra note 65, at 30-31.
8 See, e.g., DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF
HIsTORICAL THOUGHT 15-21 (1970).
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difficult problem impossible? History, is tough enough, as it is-as it actually
is."" According to its critics, the counterfactual merely risks chasing down a
"'methodological rat hole' ... [contaminated by] unanswerable metaphysical
questions that revolve around the age-old riddles of determinism, fate, and free
will."86
Critics argue every hypothetical is equally absurd because each is equally
hypothetical. The only distinction between asking, "what if Abraham Lincoln
were Tsar of Russia during the First World War," and, "what if Lincoln had
not been shot by John Wilkes Booth," is that the absurdity of the former is
simply more glaringly apparent.8 7 Detractors suggest that asking "what if'
tends to become blurred with the metaphysical question asking "why"....why
did it happen at all?"88 Opponents also dislike the lack of rigor and clear
objectives attendant to many counterfactuals.89  The goals of many
counterfactual exercises are ephemeral. Sometimes, such questions "[seek] a
cause, sometimes a motive, sometimes a reason, sometimes a description,
sometimes a process, sometimes a purpose, sometimes a justification."9
Proponents of counterfactuals acknowledge how historical questions shape
the conclusions we can reach about what had to be or what could have been.9
The main objection to counterfactual analysis tends to be directed at efforts to
fashion it into a tool of empirical analysis, rather than at more modest
applications. Even its fiercest critics admit that counterfactuals can serve as
a useful heuristic, similar to metaphors and analogies, to refine
conceptualization and integrate theory and history into practice.92 This
manuscript adopts these more modest goals.
Part III, infra, explores the drama of Anglo-German naval diplomacy before
the First World War, which culminated in the Haldane mission to restrain
German capital warship construction. The strategic context for negotiations
was the surging power of Germany relative to Britain and the introduction of
the dreadnought class of battleships by Britain in 1906. 93 Bureaucratic and
parliamentary politics in both countries played a critical role in shaping the
85 Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).
86 Tetlock & Belkin, supra note 65, at 3 (citing FISCHER, supra note 84, at 18).
87 FISCHER, supra note 84, at 15.
88 Id. at 14.
89 See, e.g., id. at 14-15.
9 Id. at 14.
9' Tetlock & Lebow, supra note 70, at 843.
92 See, e.g., FISCHER, supra note 84, at 16.
93 See infra Part III.A.I.
2005]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
negotiations. Ultimately, the Haldane mission failed to reach an agreement.94
Part IV will explore a counterfactual-what if Haldane had reached an
accord?-and suggest that such an agreement was likely to have re-directed
German naval aspirations into submarine warfare. Part V will assess the
impact of such an outcome.
III. ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE GREAT WAR
By nearly every measure of national, military, and industrial strength,
Britain was in decline relative to Germany in the years preceding the war. In
1914, the German population reached sixty-seven million people, far
surpassing every European country except Russia.95 German coal output and
energy consumption was higher than every nation on the Continent and was on
the verge of surpassing Britain's.96 German steel production stood at 17.6
million tons in 1913, while British production was only 7.7 million tons.97
The German Army was preeminent on the Continent as early as 1880. By
1910,-Berlin had nearly 700,000 men under arms, compared with Britain's
571,000.98 Four years later, the gap was wider, with the German Army
approaching 900,000 men, and British troop level dropping to 532,000. 99
Germany dominated the Continent; "whatever her precise ambitions might be,
the world would lie at her feet if she secured the control of the seas as well."'00
The British navy was the sole military force in the world superior to its
German counterpart. Churchill declared in Glasgow, "Our naval power
94 See infra Part III.C.
95 HOLGER H. HERWIG, 'LUXURY FLEET': THE IMPERIAL GERMAN NAVY, 1888-1918, at 2
(1980).
96 In 1890, British energy consumption was 145 million metric tons of coal equivalent, more
than twice the German figure of seventy-one million metric tons. By 1910, the British had
increased their consumption to 185 million metric tons, but German consumption had almost
caught up as it approached 160 million metric tons of coal equivalent. See PAUL KENNEDY, THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 201 (1987). The increase in German energy production
during the pre-war period was equally impressive: "[German] coal production grew from 89
million tons in 1890 to 277 million tons in 1914, just behind Britain's 292 million and far ahead
of Austria-Hungary's 47 million, France's 40 million and Russia's 36 million." Id at 210
" See generally Paul Bairoch, International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980, 11
J. EuR. ECON. HIST. 269, 292-99 (1982) (stating that the German share of world manufacturing
output had overtaken the British share between 1900 and 1913). French production was only
4.6 million tons. See KENNEDY, supra note 96, at 199-201, 296.
98 QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 670-71 (1942).
99 Id.
100 BERNADOTTEEVERLY ScHMrr, ENGLAND AND GERMANY 1740-1914, at 213 (1916).
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involves British existence .... It is the British Navy which makes Great
Britain a Great Power." 101 The navy became ever more the darling of British
conservatives as the last unassailable expression of British might. German
naval tonnage had grown from 285,000 tons in 1900 to 1,305,000 tons in
1914.102 At 2,714,000 tons, the British navy in 1914 still eclipsed all
challengers," 3 but some in London began to worry that the rate of growth in
the German fleet would surpass that of the British, a trend that could not long
be sustained.0 4 The German shipbuilding program, contained in the 1912
Supplementary Navy Bill, or Novelle, was viewed as a challenge to the final
respite of British authority, and even Churchill worried-prematurely, in
retrospect-that it would make English dominance at sea untenable by 1920.05
During the waning days of the nineteenth century, as British war planners
concerned themselves with checking French power, Germany sought an
alliance with Great Britain in order to exercise a free hand on the Continent.10 6
Some British statesmen, feeling France pressing in Egypt and Russia's rising
challenge in Central Asia, also sought a formal German-British alliance.0 7 In
the end, however, the British were unwilling to give up a policy of "splendid
isolation."' 8 No amount of German courting would entice London into a
formal alliance. In order to teach Britain the value of German friendship, and
the cost of German displeasure, Germany accelerated its program of naval
shipbuilding.'0 9 The ascendancy of the German fleet began as an expression
.0. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE WORLD CRISIS, 1911-1914, at 101-02 (1923). The
inevitability of German ascendancy, however, was not a universal idea. Compare Churchill's
statement to The Balance of Power in Europe: Germany's Decline, THE LIVING AGE, Oct. 25,
1913, at 135 (predicting the decline of German power).
102 KENNEDY, supra note 96, at 203.
103 Id.
104 WRIGHT, supra note 98, at 670-71.
105 READINGS IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1879, at 250-51 (W. Henry
Cooke & Edith P. Stickney eds., 1931).
106 BERNADOTTE E. ScHMIrrr & HAROLD C. VEDELER, THE WORLD IN THE CRUCIBLE, 1914-
1919, at 11 (1984). See also Scott, supra note 5, at 834.
'07 "The most important and vocal spokesman of this group was the Colonial Secretary,
Joseph Chamberlain," who envisioned a " 'Teutonic' alliance" while giving a speech in
November 1899. HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 185-86 (1994). In October 1900, Lord
Lansdowne assumed the post of Foreign Secretary. Id. at 186. Agreeing with Chamberlain,
Lansdowne was unable to secure cabinet consensus for a full-scale German alliance. Id.
'0o Kevin Narizny, Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political
Economy of Rearmament, 97 AM. POL. SCi. REv. 203, 208 (2003).
109 KISSINGER, supra note 107, at 185.
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of German power and as a form of diplomacy-a card to be played. Almost
immediately, Britain recognized it as a strategic threat.
A. Geo-strategic Politics
In addition to the rise of German power and a pervasive fear in Britain of
strategic decline, two other factors were particularly influential in setting the
stage for the Haldane negotiations. First, the British had introduced the
dreadnought class of warships in 1906. l° The dreadnought was a
breakthrough in design innovation, emplacing only large caliber guns rather
than a balanced outfit."' While this arrangement magnified combat power and
effectiveness, it was not driven by the introduction of new technology.
Consequently, other nations immediately began to replicate the ship and build
their own dreadnought battleships."' The long-standing British lead in
warships evaporated as the dreadnought became the new currency of surface
naval power. 13
The second factor was a German diplomatic blunder. A few years after the
dreadnought began to revolutionize war at sea, Germany was caught in a
clumsy attempt to intimidate France in North Africa." 4 Britain stepped in on
the side of France, embarrassing Germany and forcing the Kaiser to back
down. The Agadir Crisis fueled the momentum in Germany to build a fleet
that could stand up to the British.
1. Dreadnought Battleships
The British laid the keel for the first dreadnought at Portsmouth Dockyard
on Monday, October 2, 1905. "' The ship incorporated "a single type of
primary armament-ten 12-inch guns-instead of the mixed armament [of the
110 ROBERT K. MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT: BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND THE COMING OF THE GREAT
WAR 481-82 (1991) [hereinafter MASSEE, DREADNOUGHT]; see also JOHN ROBERTS, THE
BATTLESHIP DREADNOUGHT (1992).
l' See infra Part 111...1.
112 The United States and Japan, in particular, were moving quickly to develop all-big-gun
battleships after the dreadnought concept became public. MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT, supra note
110, at 469. In the United States, the USS Michigan was under development shortly after
Dreadnought. Id.
..3 See WAYNE P. HUGHES, JR., FLEET TACTICs AND COASTAL COMBAT 67-70 (2d ed. 2000).
114 See infra Part II.A.2.
I" MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT, supra note 110, at 478.
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pre-dreadnought types, comprised of] four 12-inch and four 8-inch guns."'16
The ship integrated the "director" system of fire in which the big guns were in
nearly parallel alignment, aimed, and fired electrically and in tandem through
a single gunnery officer." 7 Operationally, the effect was devastating."' The
larger guns, coupled with dramatically increased range and accuracy out to
twenty thousand yards, made the dreadnought the most powerful weapon in the
world." '9 The all-big-gun, one-caliber battleship ignited the "most celebrated
arms race in modem history."'
20
The dreadnought ushered in a paradigmatic shift in war at sea. Because the
dreadnought established a new metric for battleship construction, however, it
obviated the enormous British advantage in pre-dreadnought vessels.
Beginning at the new starting line, Germany copied the design and began to
assemble a fleet that might challenge the British. 2' Whether the decision to
build the dreadnought battleship was a "fatal blunder' 22 that made Britain's
overwhelming preponderance in pre-dreadnought battleships irrelevant or a
"prescient anticipation ' of future warship design, it clearly energized the
naval race. The basics of the design were easily copied by Germany and the
other maritime powers.'24 Since the dreadnought became the new ship of the
116 BRODIE & BRODIE, supra note 73, at 188.
117 Id. at 188.
1 The dreadnought design was the precursor of behemoths such as the Japanese 65,000-ton
Yamato class battleship and the 45,000-ton American Iowa class battleships (BB-61 through BB-
66) that would emerge decades later. The six Iowa class battleships were the USS Iowa (BB-61),
USS New Jersey (BB-62), USS Missouri (BB-63), USS Wisconsin (BB-64), USS Illinois (BB-
65) and USS Kentucky (BB-66). Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, at http://
www.history.navy.mil/photos/usnshtp/bb/bb6 1 cl.htm (last visited Oct. 8,2005); Department of
the Navy, Naval Historical Center, athttp://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fomv/japan/japsh-
xz/yamato.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2005) (indicating that the Yamato and her sister warship, the
Musashi, were the largest battleships ever built).
119 BRODIE & BRODIE, supra note 73, at 189.
120 Nicholas A. Lambert, British Naval Policy, 1913-1914: Financial Limitation and
Strategic Revolution, 67 J. MOD. HIST. 595,595 (1995) (indicating that the Anglo-German naval
race is the stereotype of the modem arms race). See also Bernard Brodie, On the Objectives of
Arms Control, 1 INT'L SEC. 17 (1976) (identifying the values, limits, and benefits of arms
control).
121 MAssIE, DREADNOUGHT, supra note 110, at 486. Germany laid the keel for its first all-
big-gun battleship, the S.M.S. Nassau, in 1906. Id. In July 1906, Berlin halted construction of
the warship to analyze the revolutionary design introduced by the Dreadnought and did not
resume work on the warship until the summer of 1907. Id.
122 Lambert, supra note 120, at 595-96.
123 Id.
124 See supra note 118.
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line, Germany and Britain began the naval race practically from the same
starting point.
Having experienced a breakthrough in battleship design in 1905, Britain's
Board of Admiralty spent the next ten years obsessed with the
dreadnought-clucking like hens over every aspect of its nurture and
development.'25 After unveiling the original dreadnought, the British later
introduced two generations of capital warships in years before World War I:
the oil-burning super-dreadnought and the fifteen-inch gunned battleship.' 26
In reality, the new designs were more of the same, representing evolutionary
improvements in quality.
When subordinates within the Royal Navy suggested thinking beyond the
battleship by placing a greater emphasis on submarines, the myopic Board of
Admiralty scoffed. 127 Likewise, development and countermeasures for naval
mines and torpedoes were resisted because the weapons were regarded as
unsuitable for a major maritime power. 128 After the Hague Peace Conference
of 1907, mines and torpedoes were regarded not only as careless and negligent,
but unlawful. 129 Concerns of legality and chivalry worked in collusion with
dreadnought obsession to lull the British into complacency.
If the British were blinded by the allure of battleships, the Germans were
captive to the bumbling diplomacy that had bedeviled them ever since the
Kaiser unwisely dismissed Otto von Bismarck in 1890.13'
125 See generally Jon Tetsuro Sumida, British Capital Ship Design and Fire Control in the
Dreadnought Era: Sir John Fisher, Arthur Hungerford Pollen, and the Battle Cruiser, 51 J.
MOD. HIST. 205, 226-27 (1979). Observers remarked that the nation had "Dreadnoughts on the
brain." Kenneth L. Moll, Politics, Power, and Panic: Britain's 1909 Dreadnought 'Gap', 29
MIL. AFF. 133, 141 n.72 (1965).
126 MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT, supra note 110, at 781-84.
127 ARTHUR J. MARDER, 1 FROM THE DREADNOUGHT TO SCAPA FLOW: THE ROYAL NAVY IN
THE FISHER ERA, 1904-1919, at 330-34 (1961) [hereinafter MARDER, Volume 1]. In contrast,
Lambert offers a revisionist history suggesting that both Fisher and Churchill had a deeper
appreciation of the value of developing a strong submarine force by 1914. Lambert, supra note
120, at 601, 620. Even if the revisionist theory is accepted, it likely would have come too late
to affect the counterfactual at hand.
128 See C.H. Stockton, The Use of Submarine Mines and Torpedoes in Time of War, 2 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 276,277-78 (1908). See also MASSIE, CASTLES OF STEEL, supra note 6, at 122-23.
129 Peter F. Halvorsen, The Royal Navy and Mine Warfare, 1868-1914, 27 J. STRATEGIC
STUD. 685, 694-95 (2004).
'30 ERICH EYCK, BISMARCK AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE 322 (1950). The hallmark of
Bismarck's diplomacy was a pragmatic expansionism, more careful and restrained than the
diplomacy ofthe Kaiser. See Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck's Imperialism, 1862-1890,48 PAST
&PRESENT 119, 154 (1970).
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2. The Agadir Crisis
Although not involving a capital warship, the affair at Agadir was
symptomatic of reckless German hubris and naval brinksmanship-annoying
and alerting the British and French. In July 1911, in response to a French
armed expedition to strengthen their control in Morocco, Germany impulsively
sent the gunboat Panther to loiter off Agadir, a tiny Moroccan market town
and sleepy Atlantic port.'31 Paris argued that under the Entente Cordiale of
1904, London was bound to support France.' 32 The ensuing crisis-the second
concerning Agadir in six years-further cemented French control over the tiny
North African kingdom.
The Panther made no explicit demands, and the primary motive appeared
to be German anxiety from loss of prestige over perceived French violations
of the Franco-German Moroccan Agreement of 1909. ' The move came after
several years of strained relations between Paris and Berlin over the balance
of power in Morocco. 3 4 It was evident as early as 1906 that Germany was
becoming diplomatically isolated on the issue. '35 In the second Agadir Crisis,
the Germans overreached, asking France for part of Gabon and the entire
French Congo in exchange for a reduction of German influence in Morocco. '36
Although the naval significance of the Panther deployment was negligible, the
ill-considered display of force against French interests in Africa produced a
great sensation on the Continent and was viewed as a test of the Franco-British
Entente.137 Britain intervened, delivering a stem warning against German
... MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT, supra note 110, at 710-11.
,32 Id. The Entente Cordiale was comprised of four documents, the most important of which
was the Declaration between the United Kingdom and France Respecting Egypt and Morocco.
See FirstWorldWar.Com, Primary Documents: Entente Cordiale, 8 April 1904, at http://www.
firstworldwar.com/source/ententecordialel904.htm. Article 2 of the agreement recognized
French authority in Morocco. Id.
' DAVID STEVENSON, ARMAMENTS AND THE COMING OF WAR: EUROPE, 1904-1914, at 183
(1996). See also A New Sultan in Morocco, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 446 (1909).
4 See STEVENSON, supra note 133, at 183.
135 Russia, Spain, England, and Italy stood firm with France at the Algeciras Conference in
Spain in December 1905, when France was recognized as the controlling authority for managing
Moroccan ports and the banking system. John H. Latand, International Law and Diplomacy, I
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 107, 107-09 (1906).
136 MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT, supra note 110, at 73 8-39.
13' Ernest R. May, Cabinet, Tsar, Kaiser: Three Approaches to Assessment, in KNOWING
ONE'S ENEMIES: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT BEFORE THE Two WORLD WARS 12 (Ernest R. May
ed., 1984).
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"expansionism."' 3 In the face of such resolve, the Germans bitterly backed
off.'39 The event would incite the Germans into a new round of naval
expansion.
B. Bureaucratic and National Politics
1. British Negotiating Strategy
The Liberal government in Britain desperately sought a naval arms control
agreement to reduce the cost of maintaining naval superiority.140 In 1906, the
Liberals came to power and embarked on an ambitious and costly progressive
political and social agenda." 1 Herbert Asquith was appointed Prime Minister
in 1908 and set about introducing a series of modem social reforms. The
program included the establishment of elderly pensions in 1908 and
unemployment insurance in 1911.142
In order to pay for these new social priorities, the Labor and Liberal parties
sought to control naval spending. 14 In particular, they wanted to avoid a naval
armaments race and worked together to reject legislation to fund four new
dreadnought keels annually.' 44 As early as 1909, however, it was clear that
greater naval construction would be required to counter the rapidly expanding
German fleet. After much debate, the cabinet exercised the option of building
four additional dreadnoughts, for a total of eight.'45 The massive increases in
social and defense spending were embodied in the controversial "People's
Budget" of 1909.146
38 There was particular concern that Germany planned to acquire a naval base on Morocco's
Atlantic coast, "[threatening] Imperial sealanes to South Africa and around the Cape." MASSIE,
DREADNOUGHT, supra note 110, at 729.
39 May, supra note 137, at 13.
140 John H. Maurer, Arms Control and the Anglo-German Naval Race Before World War I:
Lessons for Today, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 285, 290-91 (1997).
141 See generally A.J. ANTHONY MORRIS, RADICALISM AGAINST THE WAR 1906-1914: THE
ADVOCACY OF PEACE AND RETRENCHMENT (1972); Howard Weinroth, Left-Wing Opposition
to Naval Armaments in Britain Before 1914, 6 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 93 (1971).
142 See generally MORRIS, supra note 141; Weinroth, supra note 141.
' MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT, supra note 110, at 499; JON TETSURO SUMIDA, IN DEFENCE OF
NAVAL SUPREMACY: FINANCE, TECHNOLOGY AND BRITISH NAVAL PoLICY, 1889-1914, at 186-87
(1989).
,44 Michael Howard, The Edwardian Arms Race, in EDWARDIAN ENGLAND 145, 145-61
(Donald Read ed., 1982).
145 Narizny, supra note 108, at 208.
146 Id.
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Albert Ballin, the head of the Hamburg-American Line and confidant of the
Kaiser, convinced the Kaiser to invite British Foreign Minister Sir Edward
Grey to Berlin to discuss the spiraling naval race in February 1912.147 He
knew the German government intended to lay a new navy law before the
Reichstag that would undermine relations between the two countries. The
British were not optimistic, and Grey thought the talks foredoomed.'48
Consequently, the Foreign Minister declined to go and instead arranged for
Secretary of State for War, Haldane to serve in his place.149
In London, the negotiations had deep domestic, political implications. The
diplomacy was an exercise in preparing the home front for the expected
sacrifices necessary to continue the naval competition. No matter what the
outcome of the mission, Asquith and Grey could point to the overture as
concrete evidence of their effort at accommodation. This could preempt
criticism from the Radicals regarding escalating military expenditures. "[A]s
long as it was not revealed that the negotiations had failed of agreement on the
fundamental problem, the party leaders could say, as they did say quite
correctly, that the negotiations initiated by Haldine [sic] were being
continued."' 50
The British sent Haldane but insisted on a measure of insulation. Grey, in
a letter to Sir George Buchanan.5' in early February 1912, called the visit
"private and unofficial."' 15 2 Ostensibly, Haldane hoped to make inquiries about
university education because he presided over an education commission in
England.'53 Yet, Grey admitted Haldane would engage in a "frank interchange
of views with the German Chancellor" to explore the prospects for better
relations between the two countries.'5 4 The informal capacity in which
147 See SIDNEY BRADSHAW FAY, THE ORIGINS OF THE WORLD WAR 301 (2d ed., rev. 1930).
148 Letter from Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Minister, to Sir E. Goschen, Ambassador to
Germany (Mar. 5, 1912), in 4 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR 1898-1914, at
707 (G.P. Gooch & Harold Temperley eds., 1930). Grey thought that it would be nearly
impossible for the British position to be accepted in Berlin. Id.
149 FAY, supra note 147, at 302.
"S0 ORON JAMES HALE, PUBLICITY AND DIPLOMACY, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ENGLAND
AND GERMANY, 1890-1914, at 425 (1940).
1' Buchanan served as the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Russia from 1910-1918.
152 Letter from Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Minister, to Sir G. Buchanan, Ambassador to Russia
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Haldane went to Berlin protected the cabinet from the ramifications of failure,
while still permitting them to claim credit for any unexpected benefit.
Buchanan replied to Grey in a telegram a few days later. He wrote, "[I]f
Germany now rejected [the] olive branch which His Majesty's Government
were holding out, [the] fact of their having taken this initiative would greatly
strengthen [the] hands of His Majesty's Government should they have, in
consequence of Germany's attitude, to present increased naval estimates."'55
In another exchange, the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir Bertie, wrote in
a letter to the Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs Nicholson
that the mission was "absurd."' 5 6 He wrote, "[A] foolish move, intended I
suppose to satisfy the Grey-must-go radicals." '57 The Radicals viewed British
policy on Germany as one rooted in hysterical fear, and the Haldane
negotiations assuaged those suspicions. From the outset, Asquith and Grey
molded the visit to further their domestic political agendas. If Haldane were
rejected, it would reinforce the leverage of the cabinet. To accomplish the
complicated ruse, Churchill, in the midst of the Haldane discussions in Berlin,
delivered a bold and insensitive notice to Germany.'58 Churchill declared that
to the British, the navy was a necessity but "from some points of view the
German Navy [was] to them more in the nature of a luxury."' 59 The infamous
oration was regarded in Berlin as a transparent bullying tactic to compel the
Germans to drop the Naval Supplement. The London Times proclaimed, "It is
evident that both Mr. Churchill's speech and Lord Haldane's conversations
with the German Emperor... have been arranged and are part of a plan."'6 °
Against the backdrop of Anglo-German talks, London was warming to
Paris. The two countries began further cementing their special relationship.
While negotiating with the Germans, the British "were forging links with the
... Telegram from Sir G. Buchanan, Ambassador to Russia to Sir Edward Grey, Foreign
Minister (Feb. 9, 1912), in 4 BRITISH DOcUMENTs ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR 1898-1914,
supra note 148, at 671.
156 Letter from Sir F. Bertie, Ambassador to Paris, to Sir A. Nicholson, Permanent
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Feb. 11, 1912), in 4 BRITISH DOcUMENTS ON THE
ORIGINS OF THE WAR 1898-1914, supra note 148, at 687.
157 Id.
158 Churchill May Mar Haldane's Peace Aim, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1912, at 3.
159 HERWIG, supra note 95, at 77. The British had long wondered what the Germans would
say if England began to assemble a large continental army, "but the word 'luxus' in German has
disagreeable connotations," increasing the effect of the insult. Richard Langhorne, The Naval
Question in Anglo-German Relations, 1912-1914, 14 HIST. J. 359, 360 (1971).
160 Churchill May Mar Haldane 's Peace Aim, supra note 158, at 3 (citing an editorial in The
London Times).
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Dual Alliance that would make participation in a war against Germany more
than a mere contingency .... [P]ublicity [was] moving on one level and
policy on another."'' This arrangement was crafted by Churchill and Grey,
and it permitted Britain to withdraw its naval forces from the Mediterranean
to reinforce the North Sea fleet. 6 2 France would protect all of Britain's
interests in the Mediterranean.'63 In turn, Britain would protect the French
Atlantic coast."6 In Parliament, the new maritime division of labor was widely
criticized by groups as diverse as the Radicals, the Imperialists, and the
Conservatives.' 65 Despite domestic opposition, the leadership viewed the
arrangement as necessary to preserve dominance in the North Sea.'66
The decision to send Haldane to Berlin was designed to flatter Germany.
167
Not only was he Secretary of State for War, 6 ' but he had been a student at
G6ttingen and had co-translated Schopenhauer's multi-volume philosophical
'61 HALE, supra note 150, at 426-27.
162 FAY, supra note 147, at 320-24; MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT, supra note 110, at 823-25.
163 FAY, supra note 147, at 320-24.
164 Id.
165 HALE, supra note 150, at 431. The Radicals feared the agreement involved secret treaties,
the Imperialists argued the move abandoned British vital interests to an uncertain power, and the
Conservatives opposed the British flag's absence in the Mediterranean. Id.
'66 The moderate Manchester Guardian attacked the political implications of the plan in
articles on September 12 and 14, 1912, writing, "And this tremendous revolution in our national
policy.., has been made without the knowledge of Parliament by a little knot of men working
by methods of evasion and equivocation. Ministers in the past have been impeached for much
less." Id. at 430.
167 James Brown Scott, Lord Haldane's Diary of Negotiations Between Germany and
England in 1912, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 589, 591 (July 1918).
168 Richard Burton Haldane served as Secretary of State for War from 1905-1912. In that
post, he succeeded in transforming the British military. The reforms largely tracked the
recommendations of the Committee on Imperial Defense (the Esher Committee), which
evaluated the British military system in light of its experiences in the Boer War. The Esher
Committee finally settled on a formula to divide the land forces into the National Army,
composed of an expeditionary force of regulars, and the Territorial Army, comprised of the
militia, yeomanry, and volunteers, for home defense. See The United Kingdom Parliament
Defence Committee Publications, Defence-Eighth Report (Sept. 3, 1998), http://www.
parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm1 99798/cmselect/cmdfence/138/13 802.htm.
Because of the reforms, Britain doubled the size of its deployable force, which became the finest
army for its size in the world. The centerpiece of the service was the British Expeditionary Force
(BEF), an elite group of professional soldiers numbering only 160,000 men. VISCOUNT
HALDANE, BEFORE THE WAR, 35 (1920). In the initial Battle of the Mane in 1914, the BEF
would play a decisive role in destroying the sense of German invincibility that had pervaded the
Continent since 1871.
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treatise, The World as Will and Idea.'6 9 He spoke fluent German "with ease,
correctness, and elegance."17 He was, therefore, thought to have been "made
in Germany," possessing broad knowledge of its history and culture.17 '
Haldane would be unsuccessful, however. The Germans would prove unable
to decouple the naval issue from their desire to have a free hand on the
Continent. The British, rung through with paranoia, endlessly calculated the
strategic impact of an additional German warship every two years through to
1916.72
2. German Negotiating Strategy
Berlin sought to convert Germany's ascendant power into influence. In
1896, Kaiser William II had used the Transvaal Crisis as inspiration to boldly
and impulsively introduce Germany as a world empire on par with Britain.'73
Germany was ready to lay claim to world power status, he believed, and this
was a position that progressed naturally from continental hegemony and an
expanding naval fleet. The Kaiser asserted that no important global decision
should be taken without the deferential consideration of Germany. 174 Whereas
the British navy had dominated the world in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the Imperial German Navy would realize weltmacht, or world power,
for Berlin in the twentieth century.'75
The navy was the Kaiser's chief hobby,'76 and his vision to develop a blue-
water capability captured widespread support among liberal, nationalist, and
middle-class sentiment. 17' The Reichstag, too, supported the Kaiser. '78 Unlike
169 See generally ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLDAS WILL AND IDEA (R.B. Haldane &
J. Kemp, trans. 3 vols., 9th ed. 1948).
"' Scott, supra note 167, at 591-92.
171 Id Anglo-German Understanding, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1920 (explaining that Haldane
was a student of German life and literature and was well-known in scholarly and political
circles).
172 In the spring of 1909, royal advisor Sir Ernest Cassel wrote Albert Ballin, saying German
shipbuilding was the "Alpha and Omega of English mistrust." MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT, supra
note 110, at 801.
' Michael Epkenhans, Wilhelm 11 and 'His' Navy, 1888-1918, in THE KAISER: NEW
RESEARCH ON WILHELM II's ROLE IN IMPERIAL GERMANY, 12, 16 (Annika Mombauer & Wilhelm
Deist eds. 2004).
"' Id. at 17 (citing ERNST JOHANN, REDEN DES KAISERS (1966)).
175 Id.
176 Langhorne, supra note 159, at 369.
17' The drive to develop a force that could stand up to the British should not be attributed
solely to "the customary scapegoats: the reactionary Prussians, the diabolical General Staff, [or]
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Britain, Germany had no coordinating War Cabinet, and the Kaiser's decision
making generally was dispositive.'79 If the vision was the Kaiser's, the plan
belonged to Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz."8° Commander of the German
squadron in the Far East, Tirpitz rose to become State Secretary of the Imperial
Naval Office, or Reichsmarineamt (RMA) in June, 1897.18' He inherited a
coastal defense navy similar in force structure to the navies of Sweden and
Denmark. Determined to build an ocean-going force, Tirpitz would become
the father of the German High Seas Fleet. Taking the first step toward his
dream in 1898, Tirpitz proposed and passed a naval law that called for two
squadrons of eight battleships each, plus a fleet flagship.'82 This fleet of
seventeen ships would "constitute 'a considerable force even against a fleet of
the first rank.' ,183 The fleet would match the French fleet and gain the
attention and respect of the British. "Even the greatest sea state in Europe
would be more conciliatory towards us if we were able to throw two or three
highly trained squadrons into the political scales," Tirpitz said.'84 His next
significant move was the Second German Navy Law in June 1900, which was
enacted while the British were preoccupied with the Boer War.8 5 The Second
Navy Law proposed construction of thirty-eight battleships, comprised of two
flagships and four squadrons of eight battleships, with four battleships in
reserve. 86 This Second Law provided the basic framework for German
shipbuilding up to the war. It was amended by three Supplementary Navy
Laws, or Novelles-the first in 1906, which added six large cruisers, and the
second in 1908, which decreased the retirement age of the battleships and
thereby effectively expanded the size of the fleet.'87 The third Novelle, coming
the [dangerously] unpredictable Kaiser." Jonathan Steinberg, The Kaiser's Navy and German
Society, 28 PAST & PRESENT 102, 110 (1964).
178 Germans Cool to British, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that except for the Socialists, members
of the Reichstag were cool to Haldane's overture).
179 RICHARD COMPTON-HALL, SUBMARINES ANDTHE WARAT SEA 1914-18, at 13 (1991).
18 See Germany's Crisis is Only Postponed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,1912, at C3 (showing how
Tirpitz gained power).
"'1 MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT, supra note 110, at xxiii.
.82 Id. at 169-79.
183 Id. at 169 (quoting Tirpitz).
194 Id.
185 PAUL G. HALPERN, A NAVAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR I, at 3-4 (1994).
186 MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT, supra note 110, at 180.
... Id. at 183-85.
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on the heels of German humiliation in the 1911 Agadir Crisis, proposed the
creation of a third naval squadron. 8
Tirpitz built battleships to overcome the Reich's extremely unfavorable
maritime geographic position, which denied free access to the shipping lanes
of the Atlantic Ocean.'89 During the first decade of the twentieth century,
subsequent naval plans expanded the German fleet even further, eventually
achieving a High Seas Fleet of more than forty battleships. 9 ° Tirpitz had even
greater plans, hoping eventually to create a large battle fleet of as many as
sixty modem capital ships.' 9 ' Such a fleet would give "rough parity to
Germany with regard to Britain in ... the North Sea." '192 This force could
intimidate the British, deterring London from interfering with German
hegemony on the Continent. These developments caused great anxiety in
London, and the developing drama was closely followed as far away as the
United States and Japan. The German Naval Supplementary Bill of 1908
triggered a "naval scare" in Britain the next year, gripping the country in
hysteria over an impending German amphibious assault.'93 "[T]he whole
world was . . . watching the rivalry between German and English
shipbuilding," Grey told the German ambassador in 1908.194 By 1910, the
High Seas Fleet was emerging as the principal foe of the Royal Navy. The
naval rivalry had become acute-the epicenter of military tension in Europe.195
188 Id. at 183.
189 HERWIG, supra note 95, at 89.
"9 MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT, supra note 110, at 183.
191 Maurer, supra note 140, at 287.
192 Id.
9 The naval scare in Britain is memorialized by Erskine Childers's 1903 novel. ERSKINE
CHILDERS, THE RIDDLE OF THE SANDS: A RECORD OF SECRET SERVICE (Oxford Univ. Press 1995)
(1903). The novel sounded the warning of an imminent German invasion across the North Sea.
The book has been credited posthumously with both awakening the British to the German threat
from the sea at the turn of the century and generating a frenzy of mass panic over a most unlikely
threat. It was also made into a movie, The Riddle of the Sands, directed by Tony Maylam in
1988.
"' Letter from Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Minister to Count de Salis, Ambassador to Germany
(Dec. 18, 1908), in 4 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR 1898-1914, supra note
148, at 172-73.
195 To speak of a single arms race before the war obscures the fact that there were two
principle competitions-one on land and one at sea. In the half-decade before the war, the
Anglo-German naval race was the most dangerous and dynamic rivalry, but in the few years
immediately preceding the war, army spending by the Continental Powers dominated European
armaments. STEVENSON, supra note 133, at 9.
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Following the second Agadir Crisis, the resourceful Tirpitz used the
incident as leverage in the Reichstag to propose an increase in warship
construction, which was reflected in the Novelle of 1912.196 Drafts of the bill
were circulating in Berlin as early as the summer of 1911. Imperial German
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg "insisted upon postponing" any legislation for
naval increases until [after] the Moroccan negotiations were completed,
whereupon Tirpitz turned to a higher authority, the [K]aiser.'97 At the time,
both Tirpitz and William II felt that Bethmann-Hollweg was inadequate.
"Deep down in his heart he was a pacifist and was obsessed with... arriving
at an understanding with England," wrote the Kaiser a decade later. 98
Whereas Tirpitz led the campaign to benefit from the Agadir Crisis, the
German army stood to benefit the most, not the navy.1 99 The navy had
maintained construction of four new capital ships per year between 1908 and
1911, but army requirements were growing, and by 1911, Tirpitz was resigned
to a tempo of only two new keels per year beginning in 1912.20" The Agadir
embarrassment provided special impetus for the 1912 Novelle, which would
authorize an additional warship laid every second (or third) year for a total of
three additional warships in the out years.
In late September 1911, in the wake of Agadir, Tirpitz caught the attention
of the Emperor by resurrecting a clever negotiating ploy. He proposed a
linkage strategy, which had been developed several years before by the Foreign
Office and Imperial Chancellor Btilow-Bethmann-Hollweg's like-minded
predecessor. The bargain was this: cuts in the German shipbuilding program
might be traded for political concessions from Britain. Germany would offer
a two-part "political agreement" and would agree not to attack England.
Germany also would accept a ratio of 3:2 between the British fleet and the
German fleet.2"' The increases in the German fleet would be fulfilled through
the Novelle, but they would remain within the agreed ratio. Above all,
Germany hoped that something could be achieved that would insure Britain
would not intervene against Germany in a future continental war. Adoption
by Tirpitz of Blow's old strategy signaled that the admiral was opening to a
96 See MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT, supra note 110, at 183-85.
'9 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Lord Haldane 's Mission to Berlin in 1912, in THE CRUSADES AND
OTHER HISTORICAL ESSAYS; PRESENTED TO DANA C. MUNRO BY His FORMER STUDENTS 247
(Louis J. Paetow ed., 1928).
198 Ex-KAISER WILLIAM II, MY MEMOIRS: 1878-1918, at 128 (1922).
'99 STEVENSON, supra note 133, at 195.
2o Id. at 195-96.
201 Langhorne, supra note 159, at 359, 359-65.
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package deal, such as a compromise on dreadnoughts and a shift toward
submarines in exchange for an improved political relationship.
The demand for a political agreement with Great Britain constituted the
dominant German bargaining position throughout the spring of 1912. The
Kaiser, for example, sent Churchill a courteous message through an
intermediary indicating that any arrangement to control naval construction
"would only be possible between allies. 20 2 In effect, Germany hoped to
displace France in Britain's balance of power equation. Britain, however,
would reject the possibility of a well-defined political accommodation.
Just before Haldane arrived in Berlin in the spring of 1912, Kaiser William
II released the details of the third Novelle. The army would receive most of the
new money, but the planned increase in the naval estimate captured the
greatest share of attention in London. The bill would create a third naval
squadron to augment the two squadrons of the High Seas Fleet already in
operation. The third squadron would be formed from five existing reserve
ships and three new ships; these three new ships would be constructed over the
next six years, and they represented a net increase of three capital ships over
the 1908 naval shipbuilding program. Whereas the 1908 plan had called for
new keels for two capital ships to be laid down annually between 1912 and
1917, the Supplementary Navy Bill of 1912 proposed adding an extra ship in
1912, 1914, and 1916.203 This tempo did not achieve Tirpitz's desire to build
three capital ships per year from 1912-17, which would have resulted in six
additional capital warships, but it still represented an increase over the pre-
Agadir schedule of two warships per year. 2' The British response was that by
adding a third squadron, the Novelle opened a new dimension in Anglo-
German antagonism. The 1912 legislation became a rallying point for British
leaders who feared an erosion of London's naval supremacy on which the
entire empire depended. 25 At this precise moment the British cabinet arranged
to send Haldane to Berlin.2°6
202 CHURCHILL, supra note 101, at 80.
203 FAY, supra note 147, at 301.
204 See STEVENSON, supra note 133, at 195.
205 Tells Germany Why England Fears Her, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1912, at C3.
206 Memorandum from Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg (Jan. 29, 1912), in 4 GERMAN
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS, 1871-1914 (E.T.S. Dugdale trans., 1969) (1931).
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C. The Haldane Negotiations
The matter of Anglo-German naval limits was discussed at the Hague
Conference of 1907, and the British engaged in efforts during the summer of
1908 to re-initiate discussions.2 7 There were protracted negotiations from
1909 to 1911, and the Haldane mission in 1912 was the final focused
opportunity before the war. Winston Churchill called for a "naval holiday" in
1912 and 1913, and the Germans launched a bid to promote tacit arms control
in 1913, but these were not serious efforts.0" The final attempt by both
countries to control naval armaments was in the spring of 1914,29 but by then
the Balkan Wars and the Russo-French and Austro-German pacts
overshadowed the naval race.
Coming at the height of naval antagonism, the Haldane negotiations were
the most detailed and serious efforts to achieve an agreement. The two
governments exchanged several draft texts.210 Britain was unwilling to tie its
hands in neutrality should war erupt, suspecting German adventurism on the
Continent.21' Germany was unwilling to forego naval construction without a
concrete promise of British neutrality. 22 The negotiating positions were a
composition of bureaucratic politics and naval strategy. In Britain, the Liberal
government sought to arrest the naval armaments race in order to preserve its
naval dominance and to divert spending into social reform.2 13 In Germany, as
the army continued to secure a greater share of resources, professional naval
officers searched for a less costly method of challenging the British at sea.
Leaders in both countries began to raise doubts about their countries'
respective diplomatic isolation, imposed on Germany as punishment for
Berlin's heavy-handed diplomacy and adopted in London in pursuit of power
politics.
In a telegram to Count von Metternich, the German Ambassador in London,
Bethmann-Hollweg wrote, "[T]he British government was prepared to
continue the discussion supposing it were possible to undertake so to modify
the Supplementary Law as to enable England to renounce fresh great
expenditure on the Navy.... In this event... Haldane would at once come
207 Maurer, supra note 140, at 286.
208 Id.
209 Id.
211 See Scott, supra note 5, at 834-38.
211 Id. at 836-38.
212 Id. at 837.
213 Narizny, supra note 108, at 211.
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privately to Berlin. .. 214 Upon arriving in the German capital, Haldane's
first talks were with Bethmann-Hollweg on February 8th. Haldane would later
recount what he told to the Imperial Chancellor:
[T]here had been a great deal of drifting away between Germany
and England, and .. .it was important to ask what was the
cause. . . Germany had built up, and was building up,
magnificent armaments, and with the aid of the Trip[1]e Alliance
she had become the centre of a tremendous group.... We used
to have much the same situation with France .when she was very
powerful on the sea that we have with Germany now. While the
fact to which I referred created a difficulty, the difficulty was not
insuperable; for two groups of powers might be on very friendly
relations if there was only an increasing sense of mutual
understanding and confidence. The present seemed to me to be
a favorable moment for a new departure.215
Bethmann-Hollweg "replied that he had no reason to differ from this
view. '  Despite the lofty introduction, from the start, the British focus
remained narrowly focused on the third squadron. Bethmann-Hollweg, the
most amenable of the German leadership, wrote immediately before Haldane
arrived that his side expected something more.
[W]e think it possible to meet the British wishes, if at the same
time we receive sufficient guarantees that British policy will- be
friendly towards us. It would have to be expressed in the
Agreement that [n]either power engages to be concerned in...
schemes, combinations or war-like complications directed against
the other.217"
214 Telegram from Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to Count von Metternich, German
Ambassador at London (Feb. 4, 1912), in 4 GERMAN DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS, 1871-1914,
supra note 206, at 72-73.
215 Why Lord Haldane Failed at Berlin, supra note 5, at 60.
216 Id.
217 Telegram from Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to Count von Metternich, German
Ambassador at London, in 4 GERMAN DIPLOMATIC, DOCUMENTS, 1871-1914, supra note 206,
at 73.
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Haldane engaged in more substantive talks with the Kaiser and Tirpitz,
emphasizing the necessity for Britain to have a fleet sufficient to protect her
global commerce and vital supply of food and raw materials. 218 He noted that
Germany was free to build as she pleased, but so was England, and England
would "probably lay down two keels to [each] one" which Germany added to
her program.21 9
The tone of the interview between the Emperor and Haldane was friendly,
with the Kaiser turning at one point to ask Haldane what he should do.220
There were two interrelated issues under discussion: Germany's construction
of a third squadron and the possibility of a political accommodation between
Germany and Britain. Haldane replied, in response to the Emperor's question
as to what he would suggest, that the Kaiser "might... drop out a ship" 221 or
"spread the tempo" of construction over several more years.222
Tirpitz remarked that Britain's two-keels-to-one policy was "a hard one for
Germany. "223 At that point, Haldane opened the door to a political agreement,
asking whether a third squadron would be necessary, "if [they] had a friendly
agreement., 224 "An[y] agreement would be prejudiced if Germany carried out
its program of a third ship every second year, inasmuch as Great Britain would
feel itself obliged to lay down two for every German keel. 225 Haldane
suggested that "the world would not believe in the reality of the agreement
unless the shipbuilding program was modified., 226 The door was ajar, but
Tirpitz still blocked the entrance.
Bethmann-Hollweg confided in Haldane that the Admiralty was "very
difficult." '227 While Tirpitz was fanning public furor over Agadir and
Churchill's inauspicious "luxury" comment, 2 ' a group of maverick navy
leaders and army officials were emerging to oppose Tirpitz's grand strategy.
Like Bethmann-Hollweg, they were deeply concerned about both the financial
and diplomatic consequences of Tirpitz's plan.229 Army leaders were growing
211 Scott, supra note 167, at 593-94.
219 Id. at 595.
220 Id. at 594.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 89.




228 HERWIG, supra note 95, at 77.
229 Id. at 68.
2005]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
wary that the navy would siphon scarce resources, an issue made far more
urgent by the increasing prospect of a two-front war against France and
Russia. 230
The parties were quite close to reaching a compromise; had the Germans
tinkered with the Novelle, an agreement would have been reached. Haldane
related at the time,
After much talking we got to this, that, as I insisted that they must
not inaugurate the agreement by building an additional ship at
once, they should put off building the first ship till 1913 [instead
of 1912], and then should not lay down another till three years
after (1916,) and not lay down the third till 1919.231
The momentum evaporated, however, and they abandoned discussing
shipbuilding programs and ratios and turned toward political issues. The
Emperor felt that, after a political settlement was reached and published, he
would have the leverage to go to the Reichstag and ask for a delay in laying the
three new keels-sliding them from 1912, 1914, and 1916 to 1913, 1916, and
1919.232 Mirroring the Haldane schedule, this was progress, leaving only the
terms of political accommodation unresolved. Later, when Grey began to
distance himself from this common ground, the Emperor would be furious:
If Metternich understood his duties properly, he ought to have
told Grey a week ago that his [new] proposal meant a complete
disavowal of Lord Haldane's negociations [sic] with His
Majesty.. .; [Metternich] had to negociate [sic] on a political
agreement and not our Supplementary Bill all by itself, for this
meant interference with Germany's free right of decision and
control of the functions of the supreme War Lord! ... [The
British have turned] away sans faqon from the Haldane basis
which we accepted and demand more or less that we drop the
Supplementary Bill [altogether], and [they] do not make us the
slightest offer with regard to anything binding about neutrality!
233
230 Id.
231 Why Lord Haldane Failed at Berlin, supra note 5, at 60.
232 Memorandum from Emperor William to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg (Feb. 9, 1912),
in 4 GERMAN DIPLOMATIc DOCUMENTS, 1871-1914, supra note 206, at 75.
233 Memorandum from Count von Metternich to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg (Feb. 24,
1912), in 4 GERMAN DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS, 1871-1914, supra note 206, at 77.
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The Germans began to suspect Haldane had gone to Berlin to deliver an
ultimatum: Germany would have to abandon the Novelle in exchange for any
chance of improved relations. Grey understood that he was placing the
Germans in an untenable position. In a letter after the negotiations, he wrote,
The German Government could not be expected to discuss naval
questions as an isolated issue, if they did not see any prospect of
coming to a satisfactory political agreement. The German
increase in shipbuilding was only one new battleship in three
years: this was very moderate .... An attempt to cut down
"personnel" needed for existing units, and to drop altogether the
three [new] battleships needed for the completion of the third
squadron,-the building of which battleships was to be spread
over a long period-would be a thing that public opinion in
Germany would not accept, especially as the German
Government could not point to any corresponding concession
from England.234
After some delaying action by Bethmann-Hollweg, the German government
publicly submitted the Supplementary Navy Bill to the Reichstag. The Novelle
induced retaliatory appropriations in Great Britain. The only concrete impact
of the missions was the giving up of a future dreadnought by Tirpitz in good
faith. Churchill, with unsurpassed alacrity and cheekiness, responded, "We
therefore 'sacrificed' two hypothetical ships, and our programmes, which
would have been increased to 5,4,5,4,5,4, were ultimately declared at
4,5,4,4,4,4."235
Before the German Novelle had been formally introduced or even publicly
announced, Churchill drew up the new British retaliatory estimates and
presented them to the House of Commons. The German Emperor had
discreetly provided a copy of the Novelle to Haldane during his visit.23 6
Because it would have been a breach of faith with the German Emperor to let
on that the British already knew of the text of the Novelle, Churchill was
obliged to make his speech on naval matters on a purely hypothetical basis.
Churchill explained what the British would do if no further increases were
234 Memorandum from Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen (Mar. 6, 1912), in 4 BRITISH
DOCUMENTS ON THE ORiGINs OF THE WAR (1898-1914), supra note 148, at 707.
235 CHuRCHILL, supra note 101, at 111.
236 Langhorne, supra note 159, at 359 n.5.
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made in the German fleet: he would have to present a Supplementary Estimate
to the House, however, if the rumors were proved true237 Churchill would go
on to deliver Supplementary Estimates in the House of Commons in 1912 and
again in 1913.238
Tirpitz was indignant, writing to the Emperor, "The real purpose of the
English government to wrest Germany's sea defenses out of her hands without
any real concessions became clearer than ever. The purpose of the whole
action-the obliteration of the Novelle-has thereby been clearly expressed.
Naturally [any] English [follow-up] proposal will be rejected., 239 The Kaiser
made a note in the margin: "Right., 24 °
After Haldane left Berlin, the chance for an agreement disappeared. On
March 20, Churchill renewed his proposal for a "naval holiday" in which
neither side would build any new ships for a year.2 1' The ratio of capital
warships would be frozen. By this point, the Germans were unwilling to
accept fresh proposals.242 The British, too, realized the opportunity was lost.
As late as May 1914, the Emperor invited the First Lord of the Admiralty and
the Sea Lord to Kiel for an official visit.243 Churchill was willing, but Grey
killed the idea. From 1912 until the war, the two states were listless in
deadlock over capital warship construction. Haldane had been the last realistic
opportunity for agreement.
IV. THE HALDANE ACCORD: WHAT IF HALDANE HAD SUCCEEDED?
What if Haldane had been successful and the two parties had signed an
accord? Would a naval arms control agreement have affected the Anglo-
German relationship? As a general rule, we expect arms control agreements
to generate direct benefits and positive externalities for the parties and regional
neighbors. Arms control agreements are designed to be part of a new fabric
of international relationships in which weapons become a less critical index of
great-power status.244 Norwegian diplomat Johan Jorgen Holst observed that
237 See id. at 359-60.
238 MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT, supra note 110, at 822.
239 READINGS IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SiNCE 1879, supra note 105, at 259.
240 Id.
24' Langhorne, supra note 159, at 363-64.
242 Id. at 364.
243 Id. at 368.
244 EMILY O. GOLDMAN, SUNKEN TREATIES: NAVAL ARMS CONTROL BETWEEN THE WARS 270
(1994).
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arms control is, "a currency for restructuring political influence. 245 Among
the more than twenty potential benefits of arms control agreements are: a
reduction in the probability of regional conflict, a decrease in the intensity of
a potential conflict, a discouragement of conflict escalation, a decrease in
reliance on military force, a discouragement of the use of advanced or
inhumane weapons or tactics during war, an expansion in opportunities for
diplomatic solutions, a reduction in military and defense forces and
infrastructure, an encouragement of defense conversion, an expansion of
international trade, closer and deeper foreign relations, a reduction in distrust,
and an increase in confidence between adversaries. 246 The Haldane Accord
would have been unlikely to produce these benefits and positive externalities.
Instead, the agreement would have exposed the British to greater insecurity.
By considering the counterfactual Haldane Accord, we can better understand
the arms control process within the context of the Anglo-German naval rivalry,
and we can extract some general lessons to be applied in developing stabilizing
agreements.
The Germans could have obtained the political benefits of an accord,
however slight, while increasing their ability to threaten British supremacy at
sea through a re-channeling of resources away from battleships and into
submarines. The British might well have fared worse than they actually did
when war erupted two years later.
A complex medley of strategic, economic, personal, and bureaucratic
factors shaped the Haldane negotiations. Political actors and organizations
compete within governments to create policy, personality, and serendipity; and
fashionable or persuasive models of thinking often are dispositive in crafting
an agreement.247 Closely considering the relationship among these factors
shows how the Haldane Accord was plausible. Germany was the revisionist
power occupying the pivotal role. Bethmann-Hollweg, Metternich, and Ballin
were all proponents ofan agreement, and in hindsight, Bethmann-Hollweg was
the wisest on the German side. The savvy Tirpitz was the main obstacle to
Berlin accepting a deal. It was evident by 1912, however, that Germany was
24 Johan Jorgen Hoist, Arms Control in the Nineties: A European Perspective, 120
DAEDALUS 83, 93 (1991).
246 Seegenerally Ronald F. Lehman, InternationalArms Restraint by Treaty, Law andPolicy,
in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 523, 532-33 (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed.
2005).
247 Graham T. Allison & Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some
Policy Implications, 24 WORLD POL. 40, 42 (1972).
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losing the conventional naval race with Britain, even with the Novelle.2 41
Tirpitz was crafty enough to turn an accord to his advantage by reconsidering
his ambivalence over a submarine strategy. Tirpitz could have exchanged
three dreadnoughts for a vast expansion in submarines. The Navy Staff was
working to convince him to expand the submarine force at the same time that
Bethmann-Hollweg was extolling the value of a political agreement. Turning
an accord to his advantage, the admiral would have dramatically increased
German offensive sea power. Moreover, Bethmann-Hollweg was right about
the political value in signing an accord. While the failure of the Haldane talks
proved immaterial for Britain, for Germany the failure was profound. French
and British foreign relations were moving toward a virtual alliance.
A. The Actual German Submarine War
By 1914, Germany had a fleet comprised of thirteen dreadnoughts, sixteen
pre-dreadnoughts, and five battle cruisers.249 The admirable German effort to
emulate the British and build a balanced fleet around a core of capital ships
was essentially wasted. German warships were never able to challenge the
Royal Navy's supremacy on the high seas. Before the war, the Germans hoped
Britain would lay on a close blockade and be drawn nearer German waters in
the vicinity of the Helgoland Bight, "where German mines and torpedoes could
be used advantageously.""25  The British never complied with these
expectations, although Germany's focus on mines and torpedoes shows some
reception to an asymmetrical maritime strategy.
Against Tirpitz's dreams of a decisive naval engagement, the German
Naval Staff and Chief of the Naval Cabinet, Admiral Georg Alexander von
Muller, preferred protecting the battleships through a cautious policy of
maintaining a "fleet in being."25' Germany deferred decisive surface
combatant action until after the British fleet could be whittled down through
night attacks, submarine warfare, mines, torpedo boats, and hit-and-run
24 For example, by 1913, Tirpitz was forced to accede to British superiority in warships due
to competition for resources from the Army. MASStE, DREADNOUGHT, supra note 110, at 848.
249 ScHMrrr & VEDELER, supra note 106, at 3 1.
250 Id. at 118.
251 Paul M. Kennedy, The Development of German Naval Operations Plans Against England,
1896-1914, in THE WAR PLANS OF THE GREAT POWERS 171, 188 (Paul M. Kennedy ed., 1979);
see also Keith Bird, The Tirpitz Legacy: The Political Ideology of German Sea Power, 69 J. MIL.
HIST. 821, 821-25 (2005); Frank Uhlig, Jr., Fighting at andfrom the Sea, 56 NAVAL WAR C.
REV. 41, 42 (2003).
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raids.252 Despite the exhaustive political machinations to develop and expand
the capital ship force structure, when war came, Germany relied on kleinkrieg,
or guerilla war at sea. The submarine was the new capital ship,253 and German
commerce raiding turned out to be the most effective maritime strategy on
either side of the war. German submarines also deterred the most powerful
and valuable British dreadnought warships from freely roaming the seas. 4
The actual German submarine campaign needed only a slight nudge to
make it the dominant economic weapon it could have been. 255 As the war
began in the summer of 1914, an alarming prophesy of submarine commerce
warfare by Arthur Conan Doyle in The Strand Magazine imagined that Britain
was defeated by eight German submarines that were able to starve the island
nation into defeat in six weeks.25 6 The "first practical impetus toward
submarine commerce raiding was provided by reports of the vulnerable flow
of British and neutral shipping observed by U-boat commanders on their return
from Channel and Irish Sea operations against the Grand Fleet." '257 The
German staff also was influenced by abundant journalistic evidence of British
nervousness about the danger of German submarines from reports in the
media.258 The submarine war on commerce did not actually "[begin until]
October 20, 1914, when a U-boat [stopped and scuttled] a small steamer, the
252 See Kennedy, supra note 251, at 188.
253 ARTHUR J. MARDER, 2 FROM THE DREADNOUGHT TO SCAPA FLow: THE ROYAL NAVY IN
THE FISHER ERA, 1904-1919, at 69-71 (1965) [hereinafter MARDER, Volume 2].
254 Id.
255 The official history of the German submarine campaign in World War I from the naval
archives is ARNO SPINDLER, DER HANDELSKRIEG MIT U-BOOTEN (4 vols. 1932-1941), cited in
Philip K. Lundeberg, The German Navel Critique of the U-Board Campaign, 1915-1918, 27
MIL. AFF. 105, 105 n.l (1963).
256 See Arthur Conan Doyle, Danger! A Story of England's Peril, STRAND MAGAZINE, July
1914, cited in Holger H. Herwig, Total Rhetoric, Limited War: Germany's U-Boat Campaign,
1917-1918, J. MI. & STRATEGIC STUD. (1998), available at http://www.jmss.org/1998/article2.
html. The Journal of Military and Strategic Studies is a refereed interdisciplinary electronic
journal of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and the Centre for Military and
Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary.
257 Lundeberg, supra note 255, at 107.
258 See A. Gayer, Summary of German Submarine Operations in the Various Theaters of War
from 1914 to 1918, 52 U.S. Naval Inst. Proc. 621, 625 (1926).
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Giltra."'259 In the first six months of the war, "U-boat commanders, on their
own initiative, sank only [ten] merchant ships."26
At first, most German submarines scrupulously observed international prize
rules, which entailed stopping merchant vessels, warning the crew to
disembark, and then placing scuttling charges in their holds after the crews had
safely pulled away from the ship in lifeboats.26" ' This method was regarded as
humane and preserved the small store of six torpedoes onboard the submarine.
Protests from neutral countries, including the United States, compelled the
German admiralty to issue increasingly restrictive rules of engagement.262
It was not until February 4, 1915, that the Kaiser gave the order to sink
commercial vessels and that the war on maritime commerce began in
earnest.263 Declaring a submarine blockade of the British Isles, the campaign
lasted only six months and was formally ended under heavy protest by the
United States.2 ' As a result, many of the U-boats were sent to the
Mediterranean, sinking a large number of Italian and French ships. Diverting
U-boats from the vital North Atlantic sea lanes, however, was a British
265strategic success.
The British gradually began to arm their merchant vessels and deployed
heavily-armed merchant ship decoys called "Q-ships," which made it
increasingly more difficult for German submarines to operate under prize
rules.26 6 During the war, Q-ships sank only twelve U-boats,267 but their greatest
effect was in complicating attacks on merchant vessels since a submarine could
never be certain when it had sighted an unarmed merchant or a heavily armed
Q-ship decoy.
Germany continued to develop U-boat technology, and the newer boats put
to sea with eight to twelve torpedoes, giving the submarines greater flexibility
259 Contra BRODIE & BRODIE, supra note 73, at 182. See also MASSIE, CASTLES OF STEEL,
supra note 6, at 523 (noting that "German submarines attacked Allied merchant shipping before
the war-zone proclamation was issued").
26 Karl Lautenschlager, The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001, 11 INT'L SEC. 94, 111
(1986-1987).
261 Id. See also R.H. GIBSON & MAURICE PRENDERGAST, THE GERMAN SUBMARINE WAR,
1914-1918, at 23 (Periscope Publishing, Ltd., 2003) (1931).
262 See BRODIE & BRODIE, supra note 73, at 182.
263 Id.
264 Id.
263 Lautenschlager, supra note 260, at 112.
266 MASSIE, CASTLES OF STEEL, supra note 6, at 717-25.
267 Id. at 722.
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in attack profiles and avoiding nasty confrontations with Q-ships. 268  In
February 1917, Germany began its second unrestricted submarine campaign
in an effort to knock Britain out of the war.269 The next six dismal months
produced a slaughter at sea, with German U-boats sinking an average of over
six hundred thousand tons of merchant shipping per month, and most of that
inflicted in the North Sea.2 70
If the Germans were too slow to initiate an effective submarine campaign,
the British were even more derelict in addressing the threat. Pre-war opinion
in the Admiralty did not view submarines as a serious menace to warships or
merchants.271 The result was that by 1917, the British had progressed little in
the development of anti-submarine weapons, tactics, or strategy.272 Had
Germany exploited this exposure earlier and with greater force, the
consequences would have been devastating.
The Q-ship was never an effective response to the submarine threat. It was
not until the introduction of the convoy in May 1917, that the British finally
struck upon an effective system for protecting merchant vessels.2 73  The
convoy grouped large numbers of merchant vessels into a mass formation,
accompanied by a protective screen of destroyers. Maintaining the integrity
of a convoy was difficult work, as the vessels had to formation steam at night
and in the fog without lights, often while zig-zagging to avoid submarines. On
May 20, 1917, the first convoy from Gibraltar reached England safely, and, by
August, all homeward-bound ships from America, the South Atlantic, and
Gibraltar, with a speed of less than twelve knots, were convoyed.2 74 With the
convoy, the British learned that the most effective anti-submarine strategy was
not sinking submarines, but protecting merchant ships.2 75 By October 1917,
more than 1,500 merchant vessels had been brought into port under convoy,
with the loss of only twenty-four vessels.276 With the introduction of the
convoy, submarine commerce raiding lost its previous momentum. The
268 Lautenschlager, supra note 260, at 112.
269 MASSIE, CASTLES OF STEEL, supra note 6, at 715.
270 See id.
271 MARDER, Volume 2, supra note 253, at 349.
272 Id.
273 ScHMIrTr & VEDELER, supra note 106, at 240-42.
274 GIBSON & PRENDERGAST, supra note 261, at 176.
275 BRODIE & BRODIE, supra note 73, at 185-87.
276 Of the twenty-four vessels lost, only ten went down while in convoy formation, with the
remainder having been sunk after they were separated from the convoy. GIBSON &
PRENDERGAST, supra note 261, at 177.
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strategy was never able to completely blockade England because it was applied
intermittently for the first thirty months of the war.277
B. German Submarine Innovation and Experimentation
After the war, critics of the lackadaisical performance of the High Seas
Fleet repeatedly asked what would have happened if the Germans had a large
fleet of U-boats available at the outset of the war and effectively employed
them as commerce raiders.278 Since the early technology was so unreliable,
many respond that the submarines of 1914 were incapable of a sustained
offensive against British trade routes.279 The Reichsmarine's last peacetime
maneuvers revealed that the submarine was limited to fleet reconnaissance and
use as a torpedo unit, capable of providing an equalization factor against the
larger British fleet.28°
At the time the Germans negotiated with Haldane, however, they were on
the cusp of several breakthroughs in submarine development. Submarine
doctrine was rapidly developing. A staff study by the Submarine Inspectorate
at Kiel, prepared in May 1914, examined the requirements for a U-boat
campaign against British shipping.28 ' The report, written by Kapitanleutenant
Ulrich-Eberhard Blum, was presented to Tirpitz in June, and it projected that
a force of two hundred submarines could stop all British shipping.282 Had the
Germans shifted toward a submarine strategy in response to limits on the High
Seas Fleet imposed by the Haldane Accord, submarine technology and the
development of force structure and tactics would have progressed more
quickly. While Haldane was in Berlin, the Germans entered the zenith of
submarine warfare innovation and development.
From the turn of the century, maritime nations were experimenting with
submarines. By 1912, German submarine technology already had taken the
lead.283 The first submarine to serve as an effective offensive platform was the
Imperial German Navy's fifth Unterseeboot, commissioned in 1910 as U-9. 284
277 Gayer, supra note 258, at 621-29.
278 See Lundeberg, supra note 255, at 105-06.
279 GIBSON & PRENDERGAST, supra note 261, at 13.
280 See Gayer, supra note 258, at 625.
281 See generally id.
282 The force level may be regarded as highly realistic in light of Germany's subsequent
wartime levels of construction. See id. at 622; see also Lundeberg, supra note 255, at 106-07.
283 See Lautenschlager, supra note 260, at 102-03.
284 Id. at 103.
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It had a submersible range of 3,200 nautical miles and was armed with six
fairly reliable torpedoes. 285 Among other early German submarine engineering
breakthroughs was the progression from gasoline to diesel engines.286
Gasoline engines were extremely dangerous, had severely limited cruising
ranges, and emitted thick clouds of black smoke that revealed the submarine's
position.287 Germany began experimenting with diesel engines in its U-boats
in 1905. It was not until 1913, however, that Germany successfully launched
a diesel-powered U-boat.288 By 1914, Germany had ten diesel U-boats, with
seventeen more under construction.289
When the Germans introduced the U-19 in October 1912 (it was
commissioned in early 1913), the British had no idea that it had a range four
times that of its predecessor, which was commissioned less than nine months
earlier.291 Submarines built after the U-19 had a range of over 9,000 nautical
miles.291' These boats could remain on patrol for a month and travel 2,500
nautical miles from their base.292 Comparable cruising ranges were not
achieved by American and Japanese submarines until the 1920s, by British
submarines until the 1930s, and by Soviet submarines until the 1950S. 293 The
Germans also were well ahead of the British in torpedo and mine
development. 294 "The relationship between weapons and strategy is of course
a two-way affair: the appearance of a new system can affect strategic planning
as much as planning affects the search for new systems., 295 A treaty to limit
dreadnoughts would have provided additional momentum and added a sense
of urgency to leverage submarine development into an effective maritime
strategy.
There is an action-reaction phenomenon to arms control and technology.
Once it became apparent that the German navy would not develop the number
of dreadnoughts to credibly challenge the British fleet, German resources and
285 Id.
286 See id.
287 BRODIE & BRODIE, supra note 73, at 181.
288 Id.; Lautenschlager, supra note 260, at 102-03.
289 BRODIE & BRODIE, supra note 73, at 181.
290 Id. For the configuration of a U-19, see uboat.net, at http://uboat.net/wwi/boats/index.
html?boat= 19 (last visited Oct. 8, 2005).
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295 Harry G. Gelber, Technical Innovation and Arms Control, 26 WORLD POL. 509, 533
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energy for naval innovation would flow to more promising systems. "The rate
of utilization of an innovation is governed by the extent of uncertainty [about
the innovation] when [it] first appears and the expected rate of reduction of
that uncertainty." '29 6 The uncertainties for early submarines centered on cost,
feasibility, and expected competitive or strategic advantage.297 In the case of
submarines, by 1912, Germany was making dramatic progress in each of these
areas.
C. Germany Adopts a Submarine Strategy
The 1912 Novelle had pushed German capital ship construction to the
limits. The cost of the nascent dreadnought fleet put the High Seas Fleet in
extreme financial straits. Even before Agadir, the high cost of building an
effective surface navy was being reconsidered in Berlin. It was becoming
apparent that the navy was losing the initiative in warships against Britain. In
response to the 1908 Novelle, the Liberal government in London laid down
three dreadnought battleships or battle-cruisers in 1906-07 and 1907-08, and
two in 1908-09.298 But in 1909-10, Britain began construction on more
dreadnoughts, and ten keels were laid in 1910-11 and 1912.299 Despite its best
efforts, Germany was falling behind. The main reason Germany could not
keep up was the requirement-which would grow between 1912-14-for an
enormous land army. The accelerating British warship construction
undermined Tirpitz because it gave the impression that the Reichstag was
spending huge sums on the navy without any possibility of altering the
strategic equation at sea. Resources to continue the naval competition would
be better spent on addressing the balance of power on land, the army argued,
as it grappled with a more urgent armaments race of its own against Russia and
France.300 The army was gaining traction in the Reichstag, and opposition to
the capital ship program began to grow.3' These events strengthened the hand
of Bethmann-Hollweg. Prince Bernhard von Billow, Bethmann-Hollweg's
predecessor who had resigned in 1909, was never able to control Tirpitz.30 2
296 Id. at 514.
297 Id.
298 STEVENSON, supra note 133, at 165.
299 Id.
300 See id. at 165-78.
301 See Lundeberg, supra note 255, at 105 (citingANDREASMICHELSON, DERU-BOTSKRIEG,
1914-1918, at 1-3 (1925)).
302 See STEVENSON, supra note 133, at 171.
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Billow consistently argued that it would be wiser to spend more money on
torpedo-boats and submarines-to which England would have no
objection-than dreadnoughts, which provided for the central irritant in
London.3"3 After Billow's departure, Bethmann-Hollweg continued to play this
role, but he, too, was stymied by Tirpitz, who became an implacable political
enemy.3"
In November 1913, William II informed Tirpitz that the 1912 Novelle had
"exceeded the limits of available personnel, to say nothing of the purse., 305
The monarch hoped for a way out of the naval race, calling it a "screw without
end. 3 6 The armor plating for German battleships was produced by private
industry. Tirpitz constantly struggled with the German steel industry, which
sought to exercise monopolistic pricing power.3 7 There were considerable
resource arguments that augured in favor of stepping out of the dreadnought
competition and shifting the resources into submarines. For the steel necessary
to build one dreadnought battleship, the High Seas Fleet could have produced
between fifteen and twenty submarines.30 8
The Kaiser was willing to bend on dreadnought construction, stating that
a political agreement was "the key to everything.""3 9 All that remained was to
craft language that bridged the gap-something less than an actual alliance
favored by the Germans, but something more than the empty platitude
advocated by the British. In the end, the language would not have been as
important for either side as the reality of the accord. The British certainly
were open to something short of an alliance, favoring an informal entente
relationship that would include Germany.310 London, moreover, felt under
pressure from France in Egypt and Russia in Central Asia.31 Strengthening
303 See generally FAY, supra note 147, at 236.
3 STEVENSON, supra note 133, at 171-73.
305 HERWIG, supra note 95, at 89.
306 Id. When it was reported-incorrectly, as it turned out-that the British were considering
lowering the caliber of their heavy guns, the Kaiser immediately proclaimed relief stating, "That
would be a blessing." Id.
307 Gary E. Weir, The Imperial Naval Ofice and the Problem ofArmor Prices in Germany,
1897-1914, 48 Mw. AFF. 62, 62-64 (1984).
300 See Lambert, supra note 120, at 595 (citing a pre-publication draft manuscript by Sir
Winston Churchill, indicating that he could transform two super-dreadnoughts into "thirty or
forty submarines and torpedo-craft").
309 Scott, supra note 167, at 595.
310 KISSINGER, supra note 107, at 182-83.
311 Id. at 185.
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the relationship with Germany would serve as a counterweight to these
encroachments.
The Kaiser was the final authority on adoption of an asymmetrical strategy
of submarine warfare. With his "sabre-rattling" and "blustering speeches," the
Kaiser certainly lacked Bismarck's well of strategic thought.312 He did,
however, have a deep respect for modem technology and industry. This fed
his imagination and made him more amenable to an imaginative submarine
strategy.313 "As early as October 1914, [he] had recognized 'that no more
Dreadnoughts should be built.' ,314 With his patience regarding the hopeless
dreadnought race wearing thin, the Kaiser was vulnerable to Bethmann
Hollweg's influence. More importantly, the Kaiser was pliable, and often
mere chance dictated which way he would go. Albert Ballin would always
say, "Whenever I have to go and see the emperor, I always try and find out
whom he's just been with, because then I know exactly what he's thinking."31
"He changed his mind with bewildering frequency." 316 Bdilow agreed, calling
the Kaiser "not false, but fickle. He was a weathercock whose direction at any
moment very largely depended on the people with whom he happened to
associate."3 7  Assuming Bethmann Hollweg had gotten to him during
Haldane's visit, an accord would have been signed.
In the actual negotiations, Haldane had met one last time with Bethmann
Hollweg to work out a formula. In this meeting, the Imperial Chancellor
warned Haldane that "forces he had to contend with were almost insuperable.
Public opinion in Germany expected a new law and the third squadron."31 8 It
occurred to both men, however, that an accord should remain silent on defining
a standard proportion of naval strength and shipbuilding. After the accord was
signed, the Emperor could announce to the German public that this entirely
new circumstance of an Anglo-German political relationship now modified the
need for the fleet as originally conceived.31 9
312 HERWIG, supra note 95, at 3.
313 Id.
314 Id. at 223.
315 MASSIE, CASTLES OF STEEL, supra note 6, at 5.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Scott, supra note 167, at 595 (citing a June 1918 article that appeared in The New York
Times).
319 Why Lord Haldane Failed at Berlin, supra note 5, at 60.
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D. Interwar Naval Arms Control Re-channeling as a Model
In order to better appreciate the nature of the counterfactual history posed
here, it is useful to take a short detour into a subsequent period of naval arms
control diplomacy. German re-direction into submarines in this counterfactual
follows a model established in the wake of the interwar arms control.
During the period between the two world wars, the Washington Treaty of
1922 fixed battleship ratios for all of the maritime powers. While the
agreement actually did slow the construction of capital warships, it also had
the perverse effect of creating conditions and incentives to re-direct naval
ambitions into other systems that were not explicitly controlled.3 2' This
phenomenon is called "build-around," "re-direction," or "re-channeling. 322
The Washington Treaty is used as a model to show how a naval agreement can
incite re-channeling and how re-channeling can actually increase military
capabilities for some parties to the agreement at the expense of other parties.
This model serves as a useful theoretical backdrop to the counterfactual
Haldane Accord by showing how adoption of an arms control agreement and
a plausible shift in German strategy during the Haldane negotiations would
have increased offensive German naval power at the expense of British
security.
Professor Emily 0. Goldman has identified three separate, yet
interdependent forces that contributed to re-direction in the Washington
Treaty. First, re-direction became an unintended consequence of the treaty
terms by freeing resources and influencing parties to reexamine previously
discarded warship platforms.32 3  Second, re-channeling was driven by
technological and bureaucratic imperatives, stimulating development of new
technologies.3 24 Third, the treaty facilitated creation of fresh thinking by
members of the military leadership so they could more effectively execute their
strategies within the confines of the arms control system.325 Predictably, there
320 Treaty Agreeing to a Limitation of Naval Armament, Feb. 6, 1922, 43 Stat. 1655, 729
U.N.T.S. 161. The treaty limited United States, British, and Japanese battleship strength in a
5:5:3 ratio. See id. For an analysis, see THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, 1921-22: NAVAL
RIVALRY, EAST AsIAN STABILITY AND THE ROAD TO PEARL HARBOR (Erik Goldstein & John
Maurer, eds., 1994).
321 GOLDMAN, supra note 244, at 154.
322 See generally id.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 154-55.
323 Id. at 155.
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appeared to be less re-direction or even outright cheating with the primary
status quo power, Great Britain. This is because status quo powers generally
seek to protect their investments through incorporation of rules that restrain
potential challengers.326
Between the wars, re-direction was shaped within the context of three sets
of geopolitical circumstances. These circumstances match a corresponding
state of affairs prior to World War I that makes comparison with this study
quite uncanny. Naval competition in the interwar period was marked by
contrasting or asymmetrical agendas between Great Britain, the status quo
power, and the United States, Japan, and France, all revisionist powers in their
own way. Great Britain and Germany filled these same roles in the years
before the Great War. Britain's complacency, born from the comfort of status
quo dominance, is evident before both world wars. As between the pairing of
the United States and Japan, the United States was the status quo power and
Japan the revisionist power. In the 1920s, the United States adopted large
aircraft carriers; as the rising challenger, Japan developed mid-ocean
submarines and sophisticated destroyer tactics such as night fighting.
3 27
The Washington Treaty was perhaps most significant for what it did not
provide. "By failing to establish quantitative limits [for cruisers and
submarines, the treaty] affected greatly the naval situation up to and even
beyond 1939.,,328 Asymmetries in threat perception and the strategic
environment in the interwar period caused the United States to develop large
cruisers which posed a challenge to British cruiser superiority.329 In order to
preserve its dominance at sea against challenge from the upstart Americans,
Britain was compelled to follow the same path-for the first time building
large, long-range cruisers.33°
Asymmetries in doctrine also emerged between France and Great Britain
in the interwar period. While Britain gravitated toward matching United
States's cruiser development, France realized it could not compete in that
category, and therefore it intentionally re-directed its efforts toward submarine
326 Medieval constraints on crossbows and later restrictions on firearms served to protect
existing elites from revolutionary military technology. In 1139, for example, Pope Innocent II
declared that the use of the crossbow was forbidden because it was "hateful to God and unfit for
Christians." BRODIE & BRODIE, supra note 73, at 35-36.
327 GOLDMAN, supra note 244, at 155-56.
328 Ernest Andrade, Jr., The Cruiser Controversy in Naval Limitations Negotiations, 1922-
1936, 48 MiL. Au. 113, 113 (1984).
329 GOLDMAN, supra note 244, at 154-55.
330 Id. at 155-56.
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warfare.331 Again, the parallel of Great Britain as the status quo state facing
an asymmetrical challenge from a naval challenger comports with the Anglo-
German interface in this study. In the interwar period, only the French had the
foresight to abandon a battleship force structure and steadily build submarines
instead.332 If the French were the first to purposefully develop a submarine
force structure during the interwar period, the Japanese were the first to
integrate submarines into coherent force packages in furtherance of theater
strategy. 333 By the mid-1920s, the Japanese had the largest ocean-going
submarine fleet in the world, with a higher average speed and a greater
cruising radius than their British or American counterparts. 334 Building high-
speed submarines with greater range and more reliable torpedoes, the Japanese
developed a mid-ocean attrition strategy to keep the U.S. Pacific Fleet out of
Asia.335
In the case of the Haldane Accord, an accelerated submarine program
would have been a classic re-direction away from capital warships. Further,
it is likely Germany could have dramatically increased its submarine force with
impunity. There was an emotional need behind German naval expansion.
"The navy was the [principle] vehicle for technological advances of the late
nineteenth century and technological prowess was one of Germany's chief
means of power. She would, like her ruler, have concealed a withered arm if
she had not deployed that prowess on the water. ,336 Britain likely would have
stood idly by while Germany embarked on a program to expand its submarine
force by an additional fifty to sixty U-boats, much as she did in the interwar
years when London failed to confront Italy and Germany for clear violations
of the Washington Treaty, the Treaty of Versailles, and the Anglo-German
Naval Agreement of 1936."' 7
331 Id.
332 Id. at 168. To a lesser extent, Japan would focus on developing its submarine fleet as well,
and both the United States and the Japanese would gradually, if not entirely accidentally, explore
a force structure built around the aircraft carrier. See id at 174-75.
311 Id. at 182.
334 Id.
131 The Japanese intended to conduct massive night torpedo attacks against U.S. task forces
transiting the Pacific Ocean. Id. at 182-83. Through experimentation at the Naval War College,
the U.S. Navy was able to develop a tactical doctrine to address the threats. See Trent Hone,
Building a Doctrine: USN Tactics and Battle Plans in the Interwar Period, 1 INT'L J. NAVAL
HIST. (2002), available athttp://www.ijnhonline.org/volumel number2-OctO2/articles/article-
hone I _doctrine.doc.htm.
336 Langhorne, supra note 159, at 369.
... Office ofthe Assistant Secretary ofDefense, TheNavalArms ControlRecord, 1919-1939:
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Under the terms of the Washington Treaty, Italy agreed to limit cruiser
construction to 10,000 tons standard displacement and 8-inch batteries.
38
Between 1925 and 1933, Italy built seven "treaty cruisers" supposedly within
the limits established in the agreement.3 39 The British suspected the vessels
exceeded the treaty terms, and in reality the cruisers displaced 11,000 to
12,000 tons, exceeding treaty limits by 10-20%.34 0 In 1936, Britain acquired
a unique opportunity to verify its suspicion when the Italian "treaty cruiser"
Gorizia suffered an explosion and put into the British shipyard at Gibraltar.
34
'
The British precisely measured the vessel as displacing 11,900 tons-19%
over treaty weight. Since displacement is the key metric of warship capability,
the violations were militarily significant, but the British ignored them.342
Similarly, Britain failed to react to German naval armament violations in
the interwar period.343 Following the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles by
Germany in 1935, the British concluded the Anglo-German Naval Agreement
that same year. The agreement limited the German navy to 35% of the Royal
Navy and required Germany to conform to the rules of the Washington
Treaty.344 At the time the 1935 agreement was signed, and to the utter disbelief
of Churchill, Germany was finishing three pocket battleships that displaced
almost 12,500 tons-20-25% over treaty weight.345 More German violations
went unchallenged, culminating in the construction of five heavy cruisers
displacing 14,500 tons, surpassing treaty limits by 45%.346
Axis Violations Versus Democratic Compliance Policy Failures 4-15 (Apr. 1987) (report
prepared by National Security Research for International Security Policy) [hereinafter Naval
Arms Control Record).
... The term "displacement" was a new, treaty-defined unit of account meaning the amount
of water a warship displaced when fully equipped for war but without oil, fuel, reserve feed and
water, or a normal load of ammunition.
... Naval Arms Control Record, supra note 337, at 4-7.
340 Id. at 4.
341 Id.
342 Id. at 4-5.
341 Id. at 8-10. During the interwar period, the British elites as well as the general public had
a surprisingly high level of faith in international agreements to secure the peace. See Hines H.
Hall, III, The Foreign Policy Making Process in Britain, 1934-1935, and the Origins of the
Anglo-German Naval Agreement, 19 HIST. J. 477, 478 (1976).
3" See D.C. Watt, The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment, 28
J. MOD. HIST. 155, 157 (1956).
345 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE GATHERING STORM 108 (1948).
See also Naval Arms Control Record, supra note 33 7, at 10.
346 Id. at 11.
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The circumstances surrounding the dynamics of naval development in the
interwar period in many ways were analogous to Anglo-German rivalry
preceding the Great War. The Haldane Accord, much like the Washington
Treaty twenty years later, was likely to have made Britain even more
complacent. Germany, the revisionist state, likely would have focused on
developing innovative, asymmetrical platforms, force structure, and doctrine
to increase its naval combat power under the treaty.
V. CONCLUSION: RE-CHANNELING AFTER THE HALDANE ACCORD
The Haldane mission is a particularly powerful optic through which to view
naval diplomacy, the naval armaments race before the Great War, and the
unstable naval power structure in Europe. While conventional historiography
and international relations theory attempt to expose the fault lines of power
and decision, counterfactual history introduces new variables or events into
history to bring to the surface hitherto unrecognized patterns and weaknesses
of conventional analysis. Historical figures and contemporary social scientists
have implicitly argued that controlling the naval rivalry would have purchased
greater security. Indeed, one previous study, implicitly employing "what if'
reasoning, examined the Anglo-German naval rivalry from the perspective of
a lost opportunity for meaningful arms control.347 The findings of this study,
however, show that even if a naval agreement had been reached before the war,
it is most plausible the benefits one might normally associate with arms control
would have been negated by a German policy of re-direction or re-channeling
into submarines.
The Haldane Accord sought to limit German dreadnought shipbuilding,
ostensibly for Germany and Great Britain to avoid a reckless drive toward war.
In reality, naval arms control was viewed on both sides of the North Sea as a
euphemism for maintaining British dreadnought superiority. The single-
minded purpose of the British approach-driven solely by the metric of
dreadnought construction-left Britain exposed to maritime threats outside of
that paradigm. Unlike the Washington Treaty, which acknowledged American
parity with Britain, and SALT I, which recognized Soviet strategic nuclear
parity with the United States, the Haldane Accord did not acknowledge
German ascendancy. Whereas the latter agreements promoted confidence-
347 See generally Maurer, supra note 140.
20051
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
building independent of their effects on limiting weapons systems, 348 the
Haldane Accord would have left Germany dissatisfied.
The Haldane Accord also exhibited a lack of imagination in arms control.
The British pushed for a selective and finely-tuned prohibition on a particular
class of warship rather than focusing on controlling German offensive naval
capabilities. 34 9  This approach created fertile conditions for classic re-
channeling by Germany. At the same time, Britain was stingy on the
confidence-building aspects of the agreement, leaving Germany unfulfilled.
The negotiating positions and structure of the Haldane Accord were designed
to lead to failure.
After 1912, Germany determined that offensive action at sea should not be
undertaken except under favorable circumstances.35 ° This directive virtually
guaranteed that there would not be a decisive surface naval battle. The
Admiralty Staff was dissatisfied with Tirpitz's cautious "fleet in being"
strategy, arguing that in order to defeat the British at sea, the German navy
would have to leave port and give battle. 5 In reality, after 1912, the Imperial
German Navy was committed to a defensive strategy, dashing the chance for
a glorious naval victory.352
The German Admiralty Staff, much to its credit, never gave up pushing for
a more aggressive maritime strategy. 353 An agreement limiting capital ships
would have strengthened the Admiralty Staff in its effort to convince the
Kaiser to rapidly develop submarines in the two years preceding the war. This
would have enabled the Germans to unleash a furious U-boat campaign early
in the first year of fighting. The opportunity for German success against the
British navy was greatest in the first few months of the conflict, particularly
between November 1914 and February 1915, when the British were without
eight of their capital ships.354 Instead, the British were quite surprised at the
348 See Jane M.O. Sharp, Restructuring the SALT Dialogue, 6 INT'L SEC. 144, 145 (1981-
1982).
311 See generally Gelber, supra note 295, at 531.
3" Kennedy, supra note 251, at 188.
... Id. at 192.
352 MASSIE, CASTLES OF STEEL, supra note 6, at 72-73, 76-77.
... See id. at 193.
314 MARDER, supra note 253, at 43-44.
[T]owards the end of October 1914, the [British] Grand Fleet was without
eight of its capital ships: a mine had sunk the Audacious; the Ajax and Iron
Duke had developed leaky condenser tubes; the Orion was having turbine
trouble; the Conqueror was refitting; the requisitioned Turkish ships, Erin
and Agincourt, were not ready for action, having been too recently
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passivity of the German Fleet. "It was," according to Admiral James, "a matter
of the greatest surprise to all of us in the Grand Fleet that there were not more
'tip and run' sorties from Wilhelmshaven. Repeated excursions might have
seriously weakened us." '355 At the end of the war in 1919, as the High Seas
Fleet was interned in captivity at Scapa Flow, a German naval staff officer
reviewing German operational naval plans came across the 1912 phrase "under
favorable circumstances," and angrily wrote in the margin: "The mistake lies
here! This restriction upon the freedom of action (of the.fleet) existed until
1908, then we conquered it, now it is there again. The central point of the
question is: one cannot know beforehand if the opportunity is favourable,
Result: wait, wait,wait! 3
56 -
If an accord had been signed, Germany could have been expected to further
advance submarine technology, operational art, and strategy. Innovations were
already in motion, and limits to their dreadnought fleet would have sent the
Germans searching to re-channel into effective substitutes. In time, it would
become evident that submarines, along with torpedoes and mines, had rendered
the dreadnought obsolete.357 The real threat to Britain was in protecting
maritime commerce; for that mission, nimble destroyers were most
appropriate. In the war over maritime commerce, the dreadnoughts proved to
be a liability since they were at risk of being attacked by submarines and
required their own screen of escorts siphoned off from protecting merchant
shipping.35
A naval arms control agreement in 1912 between London and Berlin might
have diminished competition in capital shipbuilding, eased political tension,
commissioned; the battle cruiser New Zealand was in dry dock.
Id. at 43. At this point, the Germans and British were nearly equal in capital ships: the Germans
had fifteen dreadnoughts and five battle cruisers and the British had seventeen and five,
respectively. Id. An aggressive submarine force could have made the difference.
"' Id. at 45 (citing Admiral James' letter to Marder, dated Jan. 12, 1962).
356 Kennedy, supra note 25 1, at 193.
317 WILLIAM MCELWEE, THE ART OF WAR: WATERLOO TO MONS 297 (1974).
358 On August 8, 1914, the U-15 aimed a torpedo at the British battleship Monarch. The
attack was unsuccessful, but caused great concern in the British Fleet and cast into doubt the
security of the Grand Fleet's anchorage at Scapa Flow. The Admiralty ordered the fleet to
redoubt at Loch Ewe, and after additional scares, to Loch Swilly in Northern Ireland. Even Loch
Swilly was not secure, as one of the newest super dreadnoughts, the Audacious, hit a mine there.
A small number of German submarines had forced the most powerful fleet in the world to retreat
from its base to a second, and then a third, anchorage, each further from the theater of war, the
North Sea. BRODIE & BRODIE, supra note 73, at 181-82.
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and promoted cooperation.359 But arms control agreements do not always
usher in an improvement in relations or add strategic stability to the balance
of power between adversaries.3 60  The alternative history here makes a
plausible-hopefully convincing-case that a Haldane Accord was more likely
to inspire German efforts to re-channel its designs from capital warships, in
which it had fallen irretrievably behind, to submarines, in which it was surging
ahead.
The final lesson is not about the utility of an agreement, but about the
structure and expectations of negotiation-to bring the practice of re-
channeling or re-direction into focus for closer examination. The conduct and
progress of effective arms control negotiations are closely tied to a
sophisticated awareness of the development of emerging and advanced
technologies, new war fighting concepts, and experimental doctrine. The
British, in particular, lacked the imagination to appreciate how advances in
these areas would undo the status quo.
Prior to the Great War, the German capital ship naval program began as a
form of harassment against the British to punish them for their unwillingness
to join an Anglo-German alliance. But the means gradually controlled the
ends, as there was'nothing as certain to turn the British against Berlin as the
creation of a large fleet of capital warships. By 1912, it was becoming
apparent that the battleship program was not serving Germany's interests.
"For the privilege of building a navy which, in the subsequent world war, had
only one inconclusive encounter with the British fleet in the battle of
Jutland,"36' Kissinger wrote, "Germany managed to add Great Britain to its
growing list of adversaries." '362
The effect of the Haldane Accord would have been that Germany accepted
second-place status in the dreadnought naval race while re-directing resources
into submarines. In reality, Germany reached the same conclusion early in the
subsequent war, so the counterfactual merely advances the decision by about
eighteen months. The consequences of such an accord in 1912, however,
could have reshaped the entire war at sea in 1914. Indeed, it could have been
the fulcrum on which the course of the war-and the nature of the
peace--would pivot.
9 Maurer, supra note 140, at 285-86.
" Seegenerally Vally Koubi, International Tensions andArms ControlAgreements, 37 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 148 (1993).
361 KISSINGER, supra note 107, at 185.
362 Id.
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